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41.  Introduction 
1.1.  The Idea of this work 
The term 'risk' is certainly one the terms which plays a very prominent role in our lives. 
The majority of people think that they are more at risk than previous generations, although the 
expected lifetime is significantly longer (Dake, 1992). Why is it that aeroplane crashes and 
terror attacks are leading to enormous public attention and to political consequences, when the 
risk of dying in a car accident is very much higher (Gigerenzer, 2004)?  
Risk is always dependent on the reference system. For a young sportsman for example, 
10 kilograms is easy to lift, for an old lady 10 kilograms is very heavy. Or sometimes, when one 
is totally absorbed in something, an hour passes very quickly; another time, when one forces 
oneself to do something, one has perhaps the subjective feeling that the hour is endless. In the 
same way people differ in the way they perceive a risk. Moreover, there is no objective physical 
measure for risk. Risk is a subjective construct and thus highly dependent on differences in the 
individual perception and on the cultural or social framing, e.g., lay persons and experts do 
differ in the way they perceive and judge a risk. 
The over all goal of this work was to get closer to the psychological processes which are 
involved when people are dealing with risks. On the one hand, my work should be based on 
previous empirical findings and classical methodical approaches, on the other hand, these 
classical approaches should be critically analysed and developed, and also newer approaches 
should be considered. The focus should be no more on the characteristics describing the risk 
source, but on the way these characteristics are processed. At the end of this project, a model of 
individual risk perception, which is based on the results, should have been developed. 
Risk perception is always bedded in a risk situation. The way individuals deal with a risk 
is always the result of an interaction of psychological and situation elements. This work 
analysed the real-life risk situation, as it was given in the case of Dornach. Dornach is a village 
near Basel, where the soil is widely contaminated with heavy-metals (copper, zinc, lead). It is 
one of the two places in Switzerland with the highest contamination and, of course, there is a 
certain risk potential. 
This project was part of a larger project, in which several scientists from different 
disciplines analysed the case of Dornach. Although there are also a lot of interesting results from 
the other projects, I refer to them only selectively. For further information see appendix. 
 
51.2. Theoretical Background 
1.2.1. Historical roots and change of the risk notion 
The term ‘risk’ was used for the first time in the Italian commercial language of the 19th 
century (Rammstedt, 1992). The etymological roots point to the Greek language, whereby it can 
mean both root and also cliff: it means those cliffs around which a merchant ship should sail. 
The closer the ship sails around the cliffs, the faster it reaches the harbour, which certainly 
represents a gain. If the ship goes too near the cliff and is wrecked, then there is a loss. Up until 
the 19th century, the time of the developing industrial society, risk was understood as 
opportunity costs for the creation of prosperity and wealth (Dake, 1992). Blaise Pascal (1623-
1662) was the first to describe how to measure probability. The risk theory of Laplace (1816) 
especially had a crucial influence on the risk conception and on the emerging insurance 
industry. The simple formula 'risk = harm x probability' suggests a predictability and thus a 
controllability of the risk. Until the end of the 60's of the 20th century, a very limited risk 
concept was predominant. An extension and a differentiation of the term ‘risk’ seemed to be 
unnecessary due to a nearly unrestricted trust in the possibilities of science and technology. 
Since the 70's the term ‘risk’ has gained substantially in meaning and also in complexity. 
On the one hand, the obvious negative consequences of technology were certainly a reason for 
this development. On the other hand, the conception of the human was changing from a full 
rationality to a bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). It became clear that humans can not be fully 
rational like a computer, the cognitive capacity is limited, human beings make mistakes and 
they use simple heuristics, which are different to normative solutions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). This change of the conception of the human could also affect the unlimited trust in 
science and technology and therefore the concept of the risk. 
The risk concept is quite popular in today's society. Some authors (e.g., Ulrich Beck, 
1986) call the post-modern society even the risk society. Of course, disasters such as 
Tschernobyl and September 11, or diseases like AIDS and SARS are attracting more attention to 
the risk topic. Luhmann (1991, 1993) noted that there is an historical shift from danger to risks. 
In a pre-industrial time people were confronted with dangers like thunderstorms or flood, where 
they could not do very much against it, they only could hope or pray that it will not happen to 
them. In the modern or post-modern time people are confronted with a lot of different risks. In 
contrast to dangers, risks are man-made and it always has a decision of an actor behind. Renn 
(1993) explains the topicality of risk in modern societies with the following four factors: 1. The 
increase of knowledge of causal chains let events be accept any longer as fate-given. In 
consequence, people do have a growing demand of predicting and controlling possible negative 
consequences. 2. While natural dangers were reduced, civilisation risks were increasing. Since 
civilisation risks are not natural but man-made, risks have to be legitimated. 3. The catastrophic 
potential increased due to the evolution of technology requires collective decision-making 
processes. Even if the probability of a damage is very small, in case of damage  to a lot of 
people, probably all the society could be affected. 4. The individual marginal utility of economic 
prosperity is diminishing (in the western industrial nations) in favour of the marginal utility of 
general health, clean environment and psychological well being.  
In conclusion, the change of the meaning of risk and the risk conceptions, and their 
dependency on cultural change and historical events make clear that risk is a subjective 
construct and not an objective given fact (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1993). 
 
61.2.2. Defining risk 
It is not that easy to come up with a clear definition of risk. Of course, it can be seen as 
the product of probability and harm. But it could also be defined by different logarithms. A risk 
function could focus on the probability of loss, the size of the loss, the maximal loss, a product 
of probability and loss, the variance of the consequences, the semi-variance of all possible 
losses, and so on (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). Some experts even use a second order probability. 
This is the probability, in the sense of uncertainty, in how far the proper probability is correct. 
But a definition of risk only based on a formula might be not sufficient. Different scientific 
disciplines and different industries work with different conceptualisations of risk. Risk is a 
widely used, disputed and multifaceted concept. The concept might include qualitative aspects, 
e.g. economic, psychological, social, cultural, environmental, or philosophical aspects. One 
might want, for example, that only the negative consequences are defined as a risk, or one may 
also include the favourable aspects in the risk definition. The former is called pure risk and the 
latter is called speculative risk (Fishburn, 1982; Brachinger & Weber 1997). However, it is 
easier to give a definition of the risk situation than of risk itself. A basic or minimal risk 
situation in the sense of a decision structure has always at least two alternatives (see Figure 1). 
At least one alternative has at least two outcomes. It is not sure what the outcome will be by 
choosing the alternative, but one might know the probability (Scholz & Tietje, 2002: p. 176). 
Thereby, one outcome is a subjective loss in comparison to the other outcome (v(E2,1) <> 
v(E2,2). Furthermore, one of the outcomes of A2 has a higher value than the outcome of A1 and 
the other outcome has a lower value than the status quo (v(E2,1) > v(E1) and v(E2,2).< v(E1)). 
 
Figure 1. Elementary risk situation. (Source: Scholz & Tietje, 2002; adapted) 
71.2.3. Lay persons risk judgements 
Lay persons and experts do consider different aspects in their risk perception. Some 
difficulties can be experienced in judging probabilities (Hansson, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995; Scholz, 1987). There are also cultural differences in the perception of probabilities 
(Philips & Wright, 1977). In general, people tend to underestimate high probabilities and 
overestimate low probabilities, as is postulated in the Prospect Theory (Kahmeman & Tversky, 
1979, 1992).  
The Prospect Theory also postulates an individual reference point, which determines if 
an outcome is perceived as a loss or as a gain. Depending on the cognitive framing of the 
situation consequences are either perceived as a gain or as a loss. Thereby, the gain function is 
different from the loss function. The utility function (with objective gain and loss as x-axis and 
subjective utility as y-axis) is concave for gains and convex for losses. Whereas in the area of 
small gains a probable additional gain has more value than a secure lower gain, in the area of 
high gains a probable additional gain has less value than a secure but lower gain. Differences in 
the area of small losses are subjectively high evaluated. In the area of high losses additional 
losses do play a less and less important role. Thereby, a loss has a subjective more importance 
than an equal sized gain. The prospect theory as an example of a subjective utility theory is a 
descriptive theory, which is based on empirical findings. It shows that people act differently 
from the normative solutions. Nevertheless, the fact that it is possible to describe decision-
making behaviour with a mathematical function proves that people use some rules and do not 
behave irrationally. 
People also use systematically some heuristics or biases in their decisions, which are also 
in conflict with the normative solution and are insofar not rational. The availability heuristic and 
the base rate fallacy are examples of such biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). For example, 
following an aeroplane crash, the risk of travelling by aeroplane is rated higher because the 
negative event is still in mind and available. People regularly ignore the base rate in their 
judgements, which contradicts the Bayes theorem (Scholz, 1987). Changing the information 
format from a probability to a frequency format can reduce even the base-rate fallacy 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Scholz, 1987). It is advantageous to present the information with 
visualised frequencies of possible events rather than stating abstract probabilities. However, in 
some cases, for example when the decision has to be made within a short time and not all the 
necessary information is available, heuristics can be a quite good strategy (Gigerenzer, 1997). 
From an evolutionary point of view, people act in an adaptive way. 
Besides the quantitative description of risk as a product of probability and harm, lay 
people also use qualitative characteristics such as voluntariness, controllability, or catastrophic 
potential in their risk perception and judgements (Slovic et al., 1980; Slovic et al., 1985). A risk 
source is perceived as being less risky if people are exposed to it voluntarily, feeling they have 
control over the risk, or they do not see the possibility of a catastrophe. In a factor-analytical 
approach - also called the psychometric paradigm in risk perception research - these qualitative 
characteristics could be reduced to the two main factors "dread risk" and "unknown risk" (Slovic 
et al. 1980; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 1992; see Figure 2). Slovic et al. (1980) found a third factor 
exposure, which could not be replicated in other studies. 
 
8Figure 2. Locations of hazards on factor 1 (dread risk) and factor 2 (unknown risk). The 
factor space derived from the interrelationships of 18 characteristics. (Source: Slovic, Fischhoff 
& Lichtenstein, 1980; adapted). 
 
On the social level there are processes which determine the social impact of a risk. Even 
small risks (judged small by experts) can have a strong social impact. According to the theory of 
the social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 1988) individual or group reactions may lead 
to ripple effects which may affect even the whole society. One example is the case of "Three 
Mile Island". Although the problem of the nuclear reactor did not result in any casualties, the 
case became more and more important and led to consequences which were timely, spatial, and 
thematically far away from the case "Three Mile Island" (Jungermann & Slovic, 1993). 
 
91.3. The goal of the dissertation project and how to get there 
On the one hand, we wanted to describe the risk perception in the case of Dornach, and 
on the other hand, we wanted to get closer to the individual processes in risk perception in 
general. In a first questionnaire based study (part 2), we assessed the risk perception in Dornach 
on a rather descriptive level. We used a factor analysis similar to those in the psychometric 
paradigm to see where the risk of heavy-metal contaminated soil is located. 
As described in the theoretical background, the psychometric paradigm is a very 
prominent approach in the psychological risk perception research (Slovic, 1992). Nevertheless, 
this factoranalytic approach has its weak points. One problem is the Aggregation of data over 
participants (Marris et al., 1997; Lanngford et al, 1999). In the classical analysis only the mean 
of all participant for characterising a risk source is integrated in the factor analysis. Thus, it 
describes rather the risk sources than the risk perception process, and individual differences are 
excluded. Because we want to clarify the individual risk structure, we compared the classical 
with an individual solution (part 3). 
But the psychometric paradigm has also another more fundamental problem. The 
following short invented story will explain what this problem is about: 
O. Hurry conducted an investigation. He wanted to find out how a car functions. First, he 
made a list of the main components of a car and how they could be described. He then 
composed a questionnaire with it. The questionnaire was filled out by all of his students, and 
then he did a factor analysis with the results. The first factor consisted of wheels, spare tires, 
crankshaft and steering wheel. Hurry labelled this factor wheeliness. A second factor contains 
headlights, fog lights, and the oil emergency lamp. This factor was called lightiness. A third 
factor consisted of gas, brake, coupler, air conditioner, and radio button. This is labelled as 
manipulation. A fourth factor is called Instruments, whereby the revolution counter, the 
tachometer and even the clock highly loaded on this factor. Hurry did not admit more then 4 
factors. He then published his results, and ever-since, Hurry is always cited when the 
functionality of a car is discussed. However, do the factors wheeliness, lightiness, 
manipulation, and instruments really help us to understand the functionality of a car? 
As you can see this method can reduce your universe of variables in a view dimension 
but doesn't tell you anything about the underlying psychological processes, functionality or 
goals. Even Thurstone (1947), a father of the factor analysis told that this procedure only 
supplies a very first map of the field. 
Thus, the psychometric approach was very helpful (Slovic et al., 1980, 1985; Slovic, 
1987, 1992) to show that there are other qualitative and rather subjective components besides 
probability and harm, which affect the risk perception. But if we want to know more about the 
individual processes involved in peoples risk judgements, we have to go in another direction. 
And it is not simply drifting from an aggregate to an individual analysis within the psychometric 
paradigm (Marris et al., 1997; Lanngford et al, 1999). On the way to find a general risk function, 
you have to evaluate the agents space of risk cognition (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). The space of 
risk cognition includes numerical representations of the risk situation (numbers of statistics like 
frequencies or subjective probabilities), semantic aspects such as voluntarity or dread, episodic 
risk knowledge, and prototypes (pictorial representations). This is just a summery of different 
aspects people take into consideration when they deal with risk. More interesting is the question, 
which of these elements play which role and how information is integrated. Which mode of 
thinking (Scholz, 1987), intuitive versus analytic, leads to which consequences on the risk 
judgement. And in how far the cognitive space of risk cognition is influenced or interacts with 
the emotional state or dispositions of the agent? In the terms of Scholz (1987) emotional 
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involvement has an influence on the goal system, the evaluative structure, the decision filter and 
the cognitive framing. 
Thus, in study 3 and 4 (part 4 and 5), the focus was on individual processes involved in 
risk perception. Based on theoretical considerations, empirical findings in literature, and the 
own experiences with the case of Dornach (the first interview-based study), the following 
variables were included: Emotional concern, actual knowledge, self-estimated knowledge, 
desire for additional information, the use of dissonance-reducing heuristics, and thoughts about 
sustainability. In study 4 also the mode of thinking (intuitive versus analytic) was included. 
The role of emotions in risk perception and decision-making became more important 
preliminary in the last decade (Finucane et al., 2000; Schwarzer, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Lopes, 1987; MacDaniels, 1995; Karger & Wiedemann, 1998; Baron et al., 2000; Rundmo, 
2002; Sjöberg, 1998; MacGregor, 1991). Thereby, one main result is that feelings of worry and 
fear increases the perceived risk. But emotions can also affect the information processing 
(Bohner et al., 1994; Trumbo, 1999) or appear in different steps of the decision process 
(Schwarzer, 2000). In addition, not only worry or fear have an influence on risk perception, also 
other emotions can show an influence (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In our studies (3 and 4), we 
were particularly interested in what way emotional concern ("emotionale Betroffenheit") is 
related to exposure ("objektive Betroffenheit"). 
The transfer of knowledge is crucial in risk communication. To test the influence of the 
knowledge on the perceived risk, we assessed the actual knowledge participants in Dornach had 
about the soil contamination problem (e.g., the type of heavy metals, the path of danger). We 
also assessed the self-estimated knowledge, and the desire for further information. The level and 
the interrelation of the latter variable would be interesting in the risk communication context. 
The self-estimated knowledge could have a stronger influence on the risk perception than the 
actual knowledge (Baird, 1986). 
In the first study, which was an interview-like survey, we were very often confronted 
with some weak arguments. These arguments seemed to play an important role in the risk 
perception. People probably used them to reduce their bad feelings about the problem. One 
example of such a heuristic was that the more frequent appearance of snails indicates a decrease 
of the risk. This is from a natural science view totally illogical. Thus, we collected the most 
frequent of these arguments, which we labelled dissonance-reducing heuristics, and included 
this concept in study 3 and 4. 
Because the risk resulting from heavy-metal soil contamination depends on the degree to 
which one is exposed, exposure was a central variable in our studies. It was the independent 
variable in the two quasi-experimental designs in Dornach (study 1 and 3) and in the 
experimental design of the study 4. In the psychometric paradigm (e.g., Slovic et al., 1980) or 
with regard to the 'not in my backyard-effect (Marks & Von Winterfeldt, 1984), personal 
exposure increases the perceived risk. However, this influence may change with a long-term 
exposition, as it is the case of Dornach. 
Whereas the surveys of study 1 and 3 could give a good picture of the real-life case of 
Dornach, the relevant variables could be tested free of break-down effects in the Microworld 
'Dornhausen' I programmed for study 4. Of course, both methods have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Hence, using both for the same topic may be advantageous. 
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2. Risk Perception of Heavy Metal Soil Contamination and 
Attitudes toward Decontamination Strategies 
 
Olaf Weber, Roland W. Scholz, Renate Bühlmann and Dirk Grasmück (2001) 
 
Risk Analysis, Vol. 21 (5), 967-976 
 
Abstract 
Contaminated soils are a very common environmental risk all over the world. One major source 
of risk is heavy metal soil contamination caused by industrial emissions. In this quasi-
experimental study we investigated the perception of these risks by exposed and non-exposed 
people, their attitudes towards bioremediation methods using hyperaccumulating plants and the 
influence of long term aspects of sustainability on the acceptance of bioremediation methods. 
Major findings were that people living in a contaminated area perceived the risk of the heavy 
metal soil contamination as higher than the general risk of contamination. Second, we could 
show by a factor analysis that the factors dread, control and catastrophic potential were relevant 
for the perception and valuation of low dose environmental risks like the contamination of the 
investigated area. In addition, a cluster analysis showed that the risk of heavy metal soil 
contamination was perceived similar to that of oil contamination, the ozone hole, preservatives 
and genetic technology. It was perceived indifferently regarding dread. Its uncontrollability was 
estimated as medium and its catastrophic potential as low. Third, exposed and non-exposed 
participants preferred bioremediation methods to classical methods using excavation and 
chemical treatment of the soil, because they perceived the environmental and esthetical 
performance of the bioremediation as important criteria. Last but not least, sustainability or 
precautionary issues, like the prevention of harm for future generations, were highly correlated 
with the acceptance of the use of bioremediation methods on the people's residential area. 
 
Key words: Risk perception, environmental risk, heavy metal contamination, decontamination, 
sustainability 
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2.1. Introduction 
How do people living on a site contaminated by heavy metals perceive the risk of this 
contamination in comparison to non-exposed people and to different kinds of risk? Are these 
exposed people in favor for a new sound decontamination method? Do sustainability or 
precautionary criteria play a role in the acceptance of different decontamination methods? 
We wanted to analyze these questions about the risk perception of heavy metal soil 
contamination and attitudes toward decontamination strategies by this study. It is embedded in 
an interdisciplinary project that has the goal to find decontamination methods, which will be 
valued in an integrated way regarding multiple criteria. This integrative evaluation will be done 
from an ecological, technical, economical and socio-psychological perspective because the risk 
perception of residents of the contaminated area and the acceptance of decontamination methods 
are important criteria for an integrated evaluation of decontamination measures. The data and 
results of the following study will also be integrated as decision support in a multicriteria 
decision model5 to evaluate decontamination strategies. 
 
2.1.1. Contaminated Soil 
Contaminated soils are a very common environmental problem all over the world. There 
aremany heavily contaminated areas in nearly every country. One major kind of contamination 
is caused by heavy metals. This contamination has its source mainly from emissions of metal 
and steel processing plants. However, the European countries - with the exception of Eastern 
Europe - are not as affected by heavy concentrations of contamination as some countries in 
transition or some parts of the U.S.. Nevertheless, there are some areas in Switzerland, where 
the contamination could cause a risk to people's health. One of these sites is situated in the 
northwestern part of Switzerland. There the soil is contaminated especially with cadmium, zinc 
and copper passing the threshold value of .1mg/kg1. The contamination was caused by the 
emissions of a metal plant. Comparative studies showed that this concentration of cadmium 
causes health risks in a long-term exposure scenario2-4. A number of studies found that soil 
ingestion of children, long lasting consumption of food grown on the contaminated soil, and 
grazing of sheep were the most critical paths of pollution4.
In 1993, first experiments with hyperaccumulating plants, which possibly could be used 
to decrease heavy metal contamination in these "low contaminated" areas, started. Because these 
experiments were successful, scientists started to look for practical solutions to extract heavy 
metals from soil by phytoextraction using plants like willow or tobacco. 
 
2.1.2. Research questions 
We developed a questionnaire with the participation of representatives of the 
contaminated area. With this questionnaire we investigated the following four main topics: 
1. We wanted to analyze if and how the risk perception of heavy metal soil  
 contamination is influenced by exposure. For this purpose we distinguished between 
 exposed and non-exposed people and their perception of the risk on their residential 
 area, the general contamination risk in Switzerland, and the risk for oneself and for 
 other people. Following a number of former studies, people being exposed to risks of 
 soil contamination should show a higher level of concern, which leads to a more 
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sensitive risk perception by residents of a contaminated area than by non-exposed 
 residents6-10.
2. As a second topic we analyzed similarities and differences in the perception of heavy 
 metal soil contamination and other types of risks using multivariate methods. 
3. We investigated the acceptance of different decontamination strategies, including 
 bioremediation methods. These new methods were not often used in practice to date. 
 Thus, information about the willingness to accept such new methods is one important 
 aspect of a multicriteria evaluation of decontamination strategies. 
4. Last but not least we analyzed, the impact of sustainability and precautionary criteria 
 on the perception of the risk of heavy metal soil contamination and the acceptance of 
 different decontamination strategies. 
 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Procedure 
Participants who were exposed to an environmental risk (heavy metal soil 
contamination) as well as those who were not exposed filled out a questionnaire, while one of 
the project staff was present to help in case of questions. We informed the participants by mail 
that they and their city had been chosen at random. Representatives of the project group and the 
administration of the city signed the letter. In order not to prime the perceptions in any way, we 
gave no hints that the contamination of their place of residence was the main topic of the study. 
Nevertheless, participants living in the contaminated area had been informed about this 
contamination mainly by the media, especially by the local newspapers. Participants of the 
control group were living in cities with similar living conditions and size. After filling out the 
questionnaire, the participants received a small compensation ($ 12,--). 
 
2.2.2. Sample 
A sample of 80 participants participated in the study, 40 of which were living in the 
contaminated area and the other 40, the control group, were from areas in Switzerland, which 
were similar regarding the population structure, but which had not been exposed to any 
contamination. 
 
2.2.3. Questionnaire 
We developed a questionnaire consisting of three parts with questions to be answered on 
a seven point scale or with yes - no - choices. We chose these types of scales because many 
people have difficulties if they have to estimate the probabilities of risks11. The first part 
entailed questions about the risk perception of the soil contamination in the contaminated area 
and in general, including the path of pollution, groups being especially exposed to risk, and a 
description of the risk. In addition, the risk had to be evaluated by the characteristics shown in 
Table IV, which had to be answered on a seven-point scale. These items are similar to Slovic12 
and were adapted to the special situation of heavy metal environmental risk. 
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In the second part of the questionnaire the participants evaluated the risk of the 
contaminated soil and other types of risk regarding the criteria 
• Voluntariness 
• General knowledge about the risk 
• Chronic or catastrophic potential 
• Fear, and 
• Health damage 
We developed this part to analyze similarities between the risk caused by heavy metal 
contamination and risks caused by genetic technology, smoking, nuclear power, preservatives, 
oil contaminated soil, the ozone hole, and beef consumption. The comparison based on studies 
by Slovic or Schubert12,13.
With this design we tried to analyze factors of risk perception and the similarities or 
differences to other studies, in which participants were not directly exposed to a specific risk. To 
do that we compared the factor structures of the risk perceptions of exposed and non-exposed 
participants. 
In addition, we wanted to analyze similarities and differences in the risk perception 
between a low risk heavy metal contamination and other risks. Thus we did not compare the risk 
perception of laymen and experts14,15, but between laymen living in contaminated and non-
contaminated areas. 
In the third part of the questionnaire the participants had to evaluate three variants of 
decontamination methods. There were two variants of sound decontamination methods using 
hyperaccumulating plants (willow and tobacco). The efficiency of these variants to reduce 
heavy metal contamination was already investigated for the area the exposed participants lived 
in16. The third variant was a traditional method excavating the soil and treating it chemically or 
storing it on a disposal site. 
We described the variants to the participants in a standardized way, using text and 
pictures. The descriptions were created in collaboration with scientists investigating these 
decontamination methods. All three variants had to be valuated regarding their effectiveness, 
aesthetics, cost - benefit ratio and negative environmental impacts. In addition, the respondents 
had to valuate decontamination methods in general and especially regarding the degree of 
acceptance of the decontamination methods in their own area. Using these data we wanted to 
find out if affected people accept bioremediation methods. The results of this part of the study 
will be the basis of a transdisciplinary communication strategy between science and affected 
laymen to guarantee the use of the new decontamination methods in practice. 
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Participants 
The average age of the 80 participants was M=47.7 years (min=24, max=76). Half of the 
persons were male and half were female, and 66 (83%) had children. The average living time in 
the contaminated area was =19.7 years (min=1, max=76). 65 (81%) of the participants owned a 
garden and 47 (59%) consumed fruit or vegetables from their own garden. 57 (71%) persons 
owned their own land. 19 (24%) of the participants were smokers. There were no significant 
statistical differences in these data between the exposed and the non-exposed group. 
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2.3.2. Perception of local and general risk 
At the beginning, we analyzed if exposed people perceive the risk of their contaminated 
place of residence as higher than non-exposed people. 
This hypothesis was tested by a one-factorial ANOVA with repeated measurement for 
the four questions (dependent variables): 
• Is soil contamination in general a problem in Switzerland? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence a problem? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence risky for you? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence risky for other people? 
All questions had to be answered on a seven point scale with 1=low and 7=high. We 
found interactions between the groups, significant differences between the groups, and 
significant differences within the measurement, all of which are shown in Table I. 
 
Table I. ANOVA (repeated measurement) table for the perception of soil contamination 
at the place of residence and in general 
Source Df F Sig. 
Exposure 1 6.6 <.01 
Risk1 3 42.1 <.0001 
Exposure* risk 3 14.7 <.0001 
Note: Nexposed=34, Nnon-exposed=36, Meanexposed=3.87, Meannon-exposed=3,10. Missing values occur because not all 
participants answered all questions. Risk refers to the four risk questions (dependent variables). 
The factor risk consists of the three repeated measurements using the items: 
• Is soil contamination in general a problem in Switzerland? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence a problem? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence risky for you? 
• Is soil contamination at your place of residence risky for other people? 
 
As expected, exposed people perceive the risk of soil contamination in general as higher 
than non-exposed people (Mexposed= 3.9, Mnon-exposed= 3.1, p < .01). Exposed people also 
perceived the risk for themselves and for other people as higher than the control group (see Fig. 
1). However, they distinguished in an appropriate way between the general risk of contaminated 
soil and the risk at their place of residence. In contrast to their personal risk at their place of 
residence, they perceived the general risk in Switzerland as lower than the non-exposed 
participants. Thus, exposed people perceived only their specific risk at the place of residence 
higher, while they perceived the general risk at other areas lower that non-exposed people (see 
also Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Means of risk perception of exposed and non-exposed people. Exposed people 
perceive only their specific risk at the place of residence higher, while they perceive the general 
risk lower than non-exposed people. 
 
2.3.3. Perception of different risk sources 
To analyze similarities and difference in the perception of different risks, the participants 
rated the risk of the following sources13,17:
• Genetic technology 
• Smoking 
• Nuclear power 
• Preservatives 
• Oil contamination 
• Ozone hole 
• Consumption of beef 
• Heavy metal contamination 
The risks were evaluated by the following criteria: 
• Voluntariness 
• Knowledge about the risk 
• Catastrophic potential 
• Fear 
• Health damage 
To analyze the dimensions of risk perception, we calculated a factor analysis with the 
risk criteria using varimax rotation. This analysis resulted in three factors: dread risk 
(Eigenvalue = 1.59, percentage of variance = 31.9%), control (Eigenvalue=1.33, percentage of 
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variance = 26.7%) and catastrophic risk (Eigenvalue = 1.00, percentage of variance = 20.1%), 
which are similar to the factors of Slovic12 or Schubert13. These factors explain 78.6% of the 
total variance. No difference in the structure of the factors could be found for gender or 
exposure of the participants. The factor analyses for exposed and non-exposed participants 
resulted in the same three factors. We did not find any significant differences in the factor 
scores between exposed and non-exposed participants (p=.79, F=.07, df=1). Factor 1 dread risk 
consists of the variables fear (r=.85) and health (r=.87). Factor 2 control is made up by 
voluntariness (r=.73) and knowledge (r=.84). The third factor is represented by the variable 
catastrophic potential (r=.97). We present the scores of all risks on these three dimensions in 
Table II. 
 
Table II. Factor scores of the risks on the three factors dread, control and catastrophic 
Risk Dread risk Control Catastrophic risk
Beef -0,74 -0,49 -0,06 
Preservatives -0,63 0,19 -0,19 
Genetic technology -0,17 0,81 -0,22 
Nuclear power 0,15 -0,06 1,28 
Heavy metal contamination 0,08 0,43 -0,31 
Oil contamination -0,005 0,23 0,29 
Ozone layer depletion 0,79 0,31 -0,22 
Smoking 0,47 -1,3 -0,55 
Note: High scores implicate dread, uncontrollability and catastrophic risk. The factor loadings indicate a correlation 
between a risk and a factor. 
 
In the following sectors we describe the attributes of the different risks, analyzing their 
loadings on the three dimensions. The risk of eating beef can be described as not dreadful and 
controllable. Both loadings are negative (dread: -.74, control: -.49) on these dimensions. The 
risk of preservatives is similar to beef regarding the dreadfulness (dread: -.63). However, it has 
loading near 0 regarding control and catastrophic risk. The risk of genetic technology loads 
differently on the dimensions than the two risk types above. It has a very high loading on the 
dimension control (.81). That means people rated it as very uncontrollable. In contrast to that, 
the risk of nuclear power was very dreadful to the participants of the study (catastrophic risk: 
1.28). 
In this study we stressed the perception of the risk of heavy metal contamination. It is 
highest on factor 2 control (r=.43). It is a risk, which is perceived as more or less uncontrollable. 
It loads slightly negatively on factor 1 dread risk (r=.01) and negatively on catastrophic risk 
(r=-.32). It may be compared to other environmental risks like pesticides, asbestos and cadmium 
in the model of Slovic18.
It is interesting that the risk of an oil contamination shows different loadings than the 
heavy metal contamination. The respondents rated the oil contamination similar to the heavy 
metal contamination regarding controllability, but rated them differently regarding the 
catastrophic potential (catastrophic risk: .29). The perception of a higher catastrophic potential 
18
could be influenced by the occurrence of accidents causing heavy contamination of soil or 
water. 
Another group of more dreadful risks is the ozone layer depletion and smoking. Both 
were regarded as very dreadful (.79, .47) and less catastrophic (-.22, -.55). They differ regarding 
their controllability. While the ozone layer depletion was regarded as less controllable (.31), 
smoking was regarded as very controllable (-1.3). 
In general the risks show different factor scores. To analyze these differences we 
calculated an ANOVA for repeated measurement with the risks as independent variable and the 
factors as dependent variables. This analysis showed that the risks were significantly different in 
their factor scores (p<.0001, df=7, F=39.2) and that there was an interaction between the risks 
and the factors (p<.0001, df=14, F=27.3). 
The result of the factor analysis corresponds to other studies. The factor structure of the 
risks is similar to the well-known structure of Slovic18, which also could be replicated by 
Schubert13. There are gender differences in the valuation of the specific risk criteria of different 
risks, like in many other studies13,18,19, but there are no gender differences in the perception of 
the heavy metal contamination. There is, though, a tendency for non-exposed people to show 
gender differences (Mfemale= 5.8, Mmale= 5.1) while exposed people show no gender differences  
(Mfemale= 5.2, Mmale= 5.2). However, these differences are not significant. 
Looking on the ratings of heavy metal contamination by exposed and non-exposed 
people regarding voluntariness, knowledge, catastrophic potential, fear, and health damage, we 
found significant differences in general (ANOVA for repeated measurement p<.0001, df=4, 
F=68.8) and in the ratings of catastrophic potential (p<.02) and fear (p<.05). Exposed people 
judged the heavy metal contamination as less catastrophic and less fearful, while the other 
ratings did not differ between exposed and non-exposed respondents. 
Though we could not find gender differences in the factor structure, there are gender 
differences in the perception of the risks. An ANOVA for repeated measurements with "gender" 
as the independent variable and "perception of the risk criteria" (the criteria are presented in 
Table IV) as repeated measurements showed a significant gender difference (p<.0001, df=1), 
but no significant interaction. The male respondents rated the criteria significantly lower than 
the females  (Mfemale= 4.0, Mmale= 3.6), who seemed to be more risk averse. 
To group the different kinds of risks, we did a cluster analysis (between group linkage, 
squared Euclidean distances). The dendogram of this analysis is presented in Fig.2. 
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0 5 10        15        20        25 
Risk Cluster +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
Oil contamination 1 -+-----+ 
Metal contamination 1 -+     +-----+ 
Ozone hole 1 -------+     +---------+ 
Preservatives 1 -------------+         +-------+ 
Genetic Technology 1 -----------------------+       +---+ 
Nuclear energy 2 -------------------------------+   +-------------+ 
Beef consumption 3 -----------------------------------+             I 
Smoking 4 -------------------------------------------------+ 
Fig. 2. Dendogram of the cluster analysis of the risks (four cluster solution, between 
groups linkage with squared Euclidean distances). 
 
In a four-cluster solution, the risks nuclear energy, beef consumption and smoking differ 
from the other kinds of risks. Oil and metal contamination are most similar, followed by ozone 
hole, preservatives, and genetic technology. Nuclear energy as a risk with high catastrophic 
potential and also beef consumption, and smoking as voluntary risks distinguish from heavy 
metal contamination. 
 
2.3.4. Preferred decontamination methods 
With the third part of the questionnaire we checked if the participants preferred sound 
decontamination by hyperaccumulating plants to a classical decontamination by excavating the 
soil in their own gardens. 
At first we want to mention that the participants living on the contaminated sites thought 
that a decontamination of their land was necessary. They were asked on a seven point scale with 
1=not necessary in any way to 7 = absolutely necessary and rated this question with M=4.9, 
which was significant higher (p<.0001) than the rating of non-exposed participants (M=2.7). 
In Fig. 3 one can see that the participants distinguished between the three variants 
regarding aesthetics, effectiveness, costs and environmental performance. However, there is no 
significant difference between exposed and non-exposed people in the valuation of the variants. 
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Fig. 3. Means of the valuation of the different decontamination variants (independent 
variable) regarding aesthetics, effectiveness, costs and environmental performance as dependent 
variables and the overall means. 1=not necessary in any way, 7=absolutely necessary. There is a 
significant difference in the valuation of excavating and the two bioremediation strategies using 
willow and tobacco (see also Table III). 
 
There are significant differences between the variants (see Table III). In general the 
variant Bioremediation 1 (willow) (M=5.14) is rated best before Bioremediation 2 (tobacco) 
(M=4.86) and the Classical remediation (M=3.37). 
The criteria aesthetics, effectiveness, costs and environmental performance distinguish 
significantly (p criteria < .0001) as well. In addition there is an interaction between the criteria and 
the variants (p variants vs. criteria < .0001). While the respondents rated the bioremediation variants 
positively regarding their ecology, their costs, and the aesthetics, they rated the classical 
remediation method positively regarding its effectiveness. 
However, there is an interaction between exposure, the criteria and remediation variants, 
which bases mainly on the differences in the evaluation of the classical remediation. Exposed 
participants perceived the classical method as less aesthetic but as more effective than non-
exposed participants. 
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Table III. ANOVA with repeated measurement with exposure and variant 
(bioremediation 1, bioremediation 2, and classical remediation) as independent variables and the 
criteria aesthetics, effectiveness, costs, and environmental performance as repeated 
measurement 
Source Df F Sig. Mean 
Exposure 1 .86 .355 Exposed = 4,54 
Non-exposed = 4.38 
Variant 2 40.1 <.0001 Bioremediation 1 = 5.14 
Bioremediation 2 = 4.86 
Classical remediation =3.37 
Criteria 3 13.0 <.0001 Ecology = 4.69 
Costs = 3.99 
Aesthetics = 4.46 
Effectiveness = 4.69 
Exposure * criterion 3 1.3 .276  
Variant * criteria1 6 30.0 <.0001  
Exposure * variant 2 .3 .72  
Exposure * criterion * remediation 6 2.1 .05  
Note: We present the means of the valuation of the variants using the criteria aesthetics, effectiveness, 
costs, and environmental performance in Fig. 3. 
 
The respondents judged the environmental performance of the decontamination (M= 6.2)
as the most important criterion, before aesthetics (M= 5.8) and costs (M= 5.2). Less important 
was the duration of the decontamination  (M= 4.3) , which is the main disadvantage of the 
bioremediation. In addition they rated the criteria significantly differently (N=76, df=3, F=26.6, 
sig.<.0001). 
In general, the participants accepted a duration of the decontamination of  M= 6.9 years. 
There is no significant difference between the affected and non-affected respondents. 
As a next step we analyzed if sustainability as a precautionary issue is perceived as an 
important criterion to accept a bioremediation. We operationalized sustainability as "risk for 
future generations caused by soil contamination". 
To analyze if the sustainability aspect has an impact on the acceptance of a 
decontamination we correlated the perceptions of the risk of heavy metal contaminated soil - 
measured on a seven-point scale -with the rating of the sense of a bioremediation. 
We present the items describing the perceptions of the risk caused by heavy metal 
contaminated soils with their means and standard deviations in Table IV (N=80) In addition, the 
correlation to the question of whether a bioremediation makes sense is shown. 
Table IV shows that the variable "risk to future generations" correlates highest with the 
rating of the sense of a bioremediation. The correlation is high for both the exposed and non-
exposed participants. Non-exposed participants have even a higher correlation and rated this 
item higher than exposed participants. Another significant difference exists for the variable 
"decreasing/increasing of the contamination in the following years". Non-exposed participants 
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thought that it was more likely that the contamination will increase in the following years than 
exposed participants did. 
 
Table IV. Means, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients of the items describing 
the perception of risks caused by heavy metal contaminated soil 
I think that the risk caused by heavy metal Group Mean SD Correlation to 
all 5,3 1.5 .32** 
exposed 5.2 1.5 .41** 
No risk – high risk 
Non-exposed 5,4 1.5 .17 
all 4,2 1.8 -.61 
exposed 4.2 1.9 -.11 
Controllable – uncontrollable 
Non-exposed 4.2 1.6 .04 
all 4.8 1.2 .36** 
exposed 4.8 1.2 .37* 
Not dreadful – dreadful 
Non-exposed 4.9 1.2 .39* 
all 5.8** 1.4 .43** 
exposed 5.5 1.6 .40* 
Low risk to future generations –  
high risk to future generations 
Non-exposed 6.2 1.2 ,45** 
all 5.5 1.2 -.08 
exposed 5.7 1.1 -.26 
Easy to reduce – hard to reduce 
Non-exposed 5.4 1.4 .18 
all 4.4** 1.6 .09 
exposed 3.9 1.6 .13 
Decreasing during the following years – 
increasing during the following years 
Non-exposed 5.0 1.4 -.09 
all 4.3 1.7 .05 
exposed 4.1 1.6 .01 
Known to experts – not known to experts. 
Non-exposed 4.5 1.7 .08 
Note: The italicized item describes the sustainability criterion. All ratings are done on a seven-point scale. ** 
indicates significance at the .01 level (2-tailed) and * indicates significance at the .05 level (2-tailed) both for 
correlation and ANOVA. 
 
A multiple regression model, in which the variables were forced to enter the same 
equation, and a stepwise regression using the same items were significant for all participants and 
for the groups as well (pall=.002, Rall=.51, pexposed=.01, Rexposed=.65, pnon-exposed=.02, Rnon-
exposed=.62). The analyses showed that the sustainability item had the highest -weight (=.38, 
p=.02) and was the most significant variable to forecast the rating of the sense of the 
bioremediation method. The regression functions did not differ between the groups. Thus, a 
long-term risk affecting future generations seems to be the leading criterion to accept 
decontamination. 
These results show that people prefer bioremediation methods especially if they stress 
sustainability issues. This may be underlined by the finding that 76 of 80 persons thought that a 
bioremediation makes sense because we have to leave future generations clean soil. This second 
"sustainability" question was asked in a yes/no mode at the end of the questionnaire. Because of 
the low negative environmental impact, these bioremediation methods are suited to 
decontaminate low contaminated sites over a long-term time period. 
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2.3.5. Perceived path of danger 
The participants living on the contaminated sites were also asked what they think would 
be the main path, by which the soil contamination could become dangerous for them. Six paths 
were given and the participants of the exposed group could name more than one. The exposed 
group (N=40) rated eating of salads or vegetables from the contaminated soil as the most 
dangerous path for their own health (N=19). Ranking second was groundwater with N=15. The 
other four possibilities were seldomly named. 
 
2.4. Discussion 
We wanted to analyze the perception of the risk of contaminated soil by exposed and 
non-exposed people, attitudes towards sound decontamination methods using 
hyperaccumulating plants and the influence of long term aspects of sustainability on the 
acceptance of bioremediation methods. We could confirm our three hypotheses regarding four 
aspects. First, exposed people perceived the risk of the heavy metal contamination in their own 
area as higher as the general risk of contamination in Switzerland. Second, we could show by a 
factor analysis that the factors dread, control and catastrophic potential were relevant for the 
perception and valuation of risk, including the low dose heavy metal contamination risks. In 
addition, a cluster analysis showed that the respondents rated the risk of heavy metal soil 
contamination in a similar way like oil contamination, the ozone hole, preservatives and genetic 
technology. It was perceived as a risk that is indifferent with regard to dread with a medium 
range of uncontrollability and negative valuation with regard to catastrophic potential. Third, 
exposed and non-exposed participants preferred bioremediation methods to classical methods 
using excavation and chemical treatment of the soil, because they perceived the environmental 
and aesthetical performance of the bioremediation as important criteria. Last but not least, 
sustainability issues had a main impact on the acceptance of the use of bioremediation methods 
in the people's living area. 
A comparison to other studies 13,18-20 shows that the participants in our study rated 
many different kinds of risk comparable to participants of other studies. They rated for example 
the risk of smoking with nearly the same value as the respondents of Schütz & Wiedemann20. In 
their study, the rating for the risk of smoking was M=6.29 (SD=1.33), in our study, the rating for 
personal health risk of smoking was M=6.27 (SD=1.17). A comparison to the study of 
Jungermann et al. 19 shows similar patterns in the perception of the risk of ozone layer 
depletion and genetic engineering as well. In both studies - ours and the one of Jungermann et 
al. - the average rating of ozone layer depletion is significantly higher than of genetic 
engineering. Thus, our sample seems to be comparable to other studies and not strongly 
influenced by the impact of the heavy metal contamination of their living area. 
Comparing the factor scores of the risk of heavy metal contamination to the structure of 
Slovic18 this risk can be compared with risks like cadmium usage, Trichlorethylene, pesticides, 
antibiotics, or asbestos insulation regarding the factors unknown risk and dread risk. The 
psychometric characteristics of these risks, including the risk of heavy metal contamination, 
seem to be similar. Thus the ratings of the participants seem to be reliable and correspond to 
other studies. That means that there are no significant structural differences in the perception of 
"low" environmental risk compared with other risks. 
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In addition, we found that exposed and non-exposed people did not differ in the factor 
structure of risk perception. For both groups we could extract the same factors. Thus, the risk of 
heavy metal exposure led to a more sensitive risk perception, but not to different patterns of 
perception. The quality of the risk and the exposure did not influence the risk perception in a 
way that changes the factors influencing risk perception. A transformation of the characteristics 
of the risk, which people are exposed to on other kinds of risk did not take place. Also, the 
influence of fear on the risk perception of exposed people did not have a major influence as it 
does in areas where the danger for human health resulting from the contamination is more 
dreadful6,8. In our "low dose" risk situation the respondents stressed long term effects like 
precautionary issues more than worry or anxiety. These factors play an important role in 
laymen's perception of nuclear risks6. In our study, the respondents stressed long-term effects of 
the risk. This is similar to the behavior of workers who are exposed to risk. Those seem to have 
a good knowledge and less fear about the risk. Very similar patterns could be found for power 
plant workers, knowing the risk they are exposed to, but not showing as much fear as non-
exposed persons did6.
The results showed that the participants were in favor of a sound decontamination by 
hyperaccumulating plants. The main impact on this result was the environmental performance of 
this variant of decontamination and the importance of sustainability or precautionary issues as 
criteria to decontaminate soil that is not heavily contaminated. By valuating the use of sound 
decontamination methods on the contaminated site positively, the respondents showed a kind of 
collective action and did not stigmatize the environmental problems. This is an important 
condition for a community to cope with its environmental problems 21.
But why were sustainability issues as an argument for bioremediation more important in 
the non-exposed group as in the exposed group? The answer could lie in the fact that one group 
really is exposed to the risk of the contamination. For them short-term improvements of the 
contamination plays a more important role as for non-exposed people. However, the exposed 
people thought that precautionary issues were the most important criteria to look upon while 
evaluating decontamination methods. Even if the present generation is affected by the 
environmental risk the needs of future generations played an important role. 
In this study we analyzed the perception of measures of the public administration to 
handle environmental risk as well. This may be an important contribution toward fostering a 
dialogue between laymen exposed to environmental risks and scientists who want to develop 
new, sound decontamination methods that should be workable as well. We could show that the 
participants broadly accepted this new kind of environmental technology, because of its positive 
impact on sustainability. This result shows scientists who have been working on this new 
technology that the incorporation of sustainability issues in environmental risk management, 
environmental technologies, and communication will foster the acceptance of their technologies. 
Thus, the results of the study may help to understand and improve the communication between 
experts and the public regarding new decontamination methods. 
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3. Emotional Concern in Environmental Risk Perception 
 
Dirk Grasmück, Michael Hürlimann, and Roland W. Scholz (submitted) 
 
Abstract 
Numerous studies, using the psychometric paradigm developed by Slovic, Fischhoff and 
Lichtenstein, show that risk perception of the public can be described on different risk 
dimensions, such as dread risk or unknown risk. The most part of these studies were analysing 
their data on an aggregate level, i.e. using mean scores for the participants. Thus, the results of 
these studies ignore individual differences. The main goal of this study is to get closer to the 
individual structure of risk perception. A questionnaire survey similar to those developed by 
Slovic et al. was conducted, but additional characteristics, such as emotional involvement, were 
integrated (N=112). In addition, questions and answer scales were formulated the way, 
participants had to judge the risk from a personal point of view. Beside classical risk sources as 
traffic or smoking we included ultra-low risks as cellular phone, heavy metal soil contamination, 
consumption of beef (BSE), and genetically modified food in our study. Factor analysis on the 
individual level shows that the factor dread, which we found on the aggregated level, was split 
in the two factors of emotional concern (Factor 1) and damage potential (Factor 2). The other 
factors are benefit, familiarity, and control. Regression analysis shows that the factor emotional 
involvement is an essential predictor for the perceived risk, the risk acceptance, and the desire 
for additional information. Whereas emotional concern and the potential damage are significant 
predictors of the perceived risk, emotional concern and benefit are the predictors for risk 
acceptance. 
 
Key Words: Risk perception, risk acceptance, ultra-low risks, factor analysis, emotional 
concern 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1. The psychometric paradigm in risk research 
Risk can basically be defined as a function of probability and harm. Thereby, it is not 
predetermined in what way the information of probability and harm are integrated. Risk could 
be defined, e.g., as the size of maximal possible loss, the product of probability and the size of 
loss, or the variance of the consequences (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). In general, laypersons and 
experts do differ in the way they judge a risk. Laypersons do underestimate the mortal rate for 
risk sources with statistical high mortal rates and overestimate the mortal rate for risk sources 
with statistical low mortal rates (Fischhoff et al., 1981). Moreover, laypersons do not only 
consider probability and harm in their risk perception.  
Whereas Star (1969) proposed, that the risk acceptance is given, if the risk is approved 
by the behaviour of the society, in the sense of 'revealed preferences', Fischhoff et al. (1978) 
argued that persons have to be asked, if they accept a risk, in the sense of 'expressed 
preferences'. This was the starting point of a shift to a so-called psychometric paradigm in 
psychological risk research. A series of studies could show very well that people are taking 
beside the quantitative information of probability and harm also qualitative characteristics into 
their consideration, when they have to judge a risk (Slovic et al., 1980; Fischhoff et al., 1981, 
Slovic et al., 1985; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 1992). The goal of these studies was to identify the 
cognitive and evaluative structure of the risk perception. Thereby, the use of factor analysis as 
method was very crucial. 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1980) could identify some relevant characteristics, 
such as familiarity, involuntary, or catastrophic potential, and reduce them into the 3 factors 
dread risk, unknown risk, and exposure. The factor dread risk consisted of characteristics such 
as uncontrollable, global catastrophic, fatal consequence, high risk to future generation. Nuclear 
plants or nuclear weapons have high loadings on this factor. The factor unknown risk included 
characteristics such as risks unknown to science, unknown to those exposed, new risk or not 
observable. Here, genetic engineering yields high scores. The third factor was representing the 
number of people exposed to the hazard and the degree of one's personal exposure. The higher a 
risk source was rated on these three factors, especially on the factor dread, the higher was its 
perceived risk. Other studies found different but mostly similar factors (Slovic et al., 1985; 
Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 1992). Particularly, the third factor exposure could be not confirmed. 
 
3.1.2. Shifting to an individual perspective 
The psychometric paradigm can obviously be declared as a very dominant and 
successful approach in risk research. It allows, by using aggregated data over participants (for 
each risk source and characteristics the mean of the ratings of all participants), a comparison of 
the different risk sources and to represent them in a factor space, i.e. a cognitive risk map 
(Slovic, 1987, see Figure 1 & 2). Nevertheless, one problem of this method is, as it is used by 
most part of the authors, that it less describes the risk perception than the risk sources. As a 
result, individual differences, which could give a look on the individual processes involved in 
risk perception, are covered. 
Some authors already compared the over participants aggregated factor analyses with a 
non-aggregated individual solution (Marris et al., 1997; Langford et al., 1999; Karger & 
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Wiedemann, 1998). Individual differences were found particularly in the characteristics 
describing the context rather than the risk source. They found individual differences in the 
characteristics knowledge (Marris et al., 1997), control and familiarity (Karger & Wiedemann, 
1998), and the extent risk are perceived as horrifying (Langford et al., 1999; Marris et al., 1997). 
On the individual level, the factor solutions and the correlation were quite similar to the 
aggregated level (Marris et al., 1997). Only the correlation between knowledge and perceived 
risk magnitude could be not confirmed on the individual level. 
The formulations of the items could also have an influence on the judgements. If the 
items are formulated in a general way, e.g. are people afraid of the risks instead of are you afraid 
of the risks, it reflects only a rather general attitude and does not tell very much about the 
individual risk perception. Thus, the change of the questionnaire items to a more personal 
formulation could be a good way to get closer to an individual perspective. A quite substantial 
difference could be found between the general risk ratings, as it is usually used in the 
psychometric risk research, and the personal risk ratings. There is a consistent optimistic bias 
concerning personal risks, called unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1984, 1989, Sjöberg, 1998, 
2000). 
Considering that the factor solution depends on the characteristics included in the 
analysis, the factor solution might change by adding additional characteristics. By analysing the 
trend in risk perception and decision making research, one finding is that to the role of emotions 
should be paid more attention (Schwarzer, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lopes, 1987; 
McDaniels et al., 1995; Karger & Wiedemann, 1998; Baron et al., 2000; Rundmo, 2002; 
Sjöberg, 1998; MacGregor, 1991). Worry seems to be a strong predictor for risk perception 
(MacGregor, 1991; Sjöberg, 1998a; Baron et al., 2000). In the psychometric paradigm one of 
the characteristics is fear (even not always included). But fear is not the only emotion which can 
influence the risk perception, also other emotions are affecting the risk judgements (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000). Thus, in our own study, we included an additional characteristic, which should 
cover the emotional influence: emotional involvement. To assess the emotional involvement, we 
asked the people in how far they are emotionally involved and feel concerned about the risk 
source. 
Furthermore, we included the perceived probability of harm for oneself and the 
perceived severity of harm for oneself. As the psychometric approach could stress very well the 
importance of qualitative characteristics, e.g., familiarity or control, the quantitative components 
of probability and harm were often neglected. However, several researchers have shown that 
this quantitative information plays also a crucial role in the risk perception of lay-people 
(Gardner & Gould, 1989; Sjöberg, 1993; Holtgrave & Weber, 1993, Borcherding, Rohrmann & 
Eppel, 1986; Karger & Wiedemann, 1998). It might be interesting to investigate the relative 
importance of these characteristics by including them in the same analysis. We also included the 
perceived benefit, which was not a characteristic in the original studies of Slovic et al. (1980, 
1985). In general, a risk source also has its positive aspects. Thus, it can be distinguished 
between two risk concepts, the 'pure risk' and the speculative risk' (Fishburn, 1982). The latter is 
also considering the positive aspects of a risk. 
In conclusion, one main goal of this study is to get a better understanding of the 
individual process in risk perception by changing to an individual level in the factor analysis, 
changing the formulations of the items into more personal ones, and adding additional 
characteristics such as emotional involvement. Taking the characteristics, i.e. the resulting 
factors as independent variables, we are interested in four dependent variables. Of course, the 
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perceived personal health risk and the risk acceptance are very central. Beside the risk 
acceptance the desire for additional information should play a key role in risk communication as 
well, and thus we included the desire for additional information as third dependent variable. We 
wanted also know, in how far people are focusing more on the probability or on the harm. 
 
3.1.3. Ultra-low risks 
Beside the choice and the formulation of the risk characteristics also the choice of the 
risk sources may affect the results. Almost in the last two decades environmental risks with very 
low probabilities and low or uncertain damage potential become more important, such cellular 
phone (the use of cellular phones or living near a transmitter) and the consumption of 
genetically modified food or beef. The latter means the risk of BSE. As lay-people do generally 
have problems to deal with probabilities (Hanson, 1989; Gigerenzer, 1997; Phillips, 1977, 
Scholz, 1987), it might be interesting to see how they judge such risk sources with very low 
probabilities. In addition, we included the popular high health risks of traffic and smoking, and 
also the risk of nuclear energy in our study. We wanted to compare these three classical risks 
with the ultra-low risks of cellular phone, heavy-metal soil contamination, the consumption of 
genetically modified food, and the consumption of beef (BSE). 
 
3.1.4. Research questions 
According to the above mentioned theoretical and methodological considerations the 
following research questions can be formulated: 1) Does the factor-solution change if data is 
aggregated over risks instead of an aggregation over individuals? Which factors can be found? 
2) Does the factor-solution change if additional characteristics, e.g. emotional involvement, are 
added? What are the best predictors for 3) the personal risk perception, 4) the risk acceptance, 
and 5) the desire for additional information on the individual level? 5) Where are the risk 
sources arranged in the factor scenery? 
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3.2. METHOD 
3.2.1. The questionnaire 
We used a questionnaire similar to other questionnaires used in the area of the 
psychometric paradigm. The seven risk sources are described at the beginning of the 
questionnaire (see Table I). The questionnaire contains 21 items, i.e. 17 risk characteristics and 
4 dependent variables, such as perceived risk, risk acceptance, weighting of harm versus 
probability, and desire for additional information (see Table II). 12 of the 17 characteristics were 
adapted from Slovic et al. (1985) and Slovic (1987). We formulated some of these items in a 
more personal way than the original formulation was, e.g. instead of a general fear we asked the 
personal fear. Five additional characteristics were added such as emotional involvement, the 
perceived probability of harm for oneself, and the expected severity of harm for oneself, and the 
societal and personal benefits. The items had to be answered on a bipolar five-point scale. 
Participants had to judge all the seven risk sources with the 21 items. Thus, they had to make 
147 judgements.  
 
Tab. I: Description of the risk sources at the beginning of the questionnaire. 
Risk source Description 
Cellular phone Electromagnetic fields (Electro smog) resulting from the use of cellular phones 
or from base stations. 
Genetically modified food Consumption of genetically modified food. 
Consumption of beef Consumption of beef, risk resulting from BSE. 
Heavy-metal soil 
contamination 
Soil is contaminated with heavy metals (e.g., cadmium, copper, and lead) at the 
residence.  
Nuclear energy Nuclear plant or transport of nuclear material. Risk of radiation. 
Smoking Smoking actively or passively. 
Traffic Joining the traffic actively or passively.. 
The following questions (control variables) had to be answered at the end of the 
questionnaire: 1) Do you own a cellular phone? 2) How important is the communication by 
cellular phone for you? 3) How many minutes you approximately use a cellular phone by week? 
4) Are you vegetarian? 5) Did you stop to eat beef for the time being? Of course, age and gender 
were assessed, too. 
 
3.2.2. Participants 
112 Swiss high-schools students (29 male and 83 female) participated in this study. The 
average of the age of the participants was M=17.8 (min=16, max=21). 25 participants (22.3 %) 
were smoking and 15 (13.4 %) were a member of a 'green' organisation. Whereas 22 participants 
(19.6 %) answered being vegetarian, 40 participants (35.7 %) told that they do not eat beef for 
the time being. 
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Tab. II: Questionnaire items. 
Poles of the scale 
Item 
 
Description  1 5
1 Familiarity Is this source of risk new and unknown or familiar to you? new/ unknown very familiar 
2 Level of knowledge How do you estimate the extent of your knowledge about the 
risk/ risk source? 
no knowledge precise knowledge 
3 Desire for additional 
information** 
Do you wish you could have further information? sufficient 
knowledge 
pronounced need 
for additional 
information 
4 Emotional 
involvement* 
To what extent are you emotionally involved and feel 
concerned? 
do not feel 
concerned 
feel very much 
concerned 
5 Personal exposure To what extent are you personally exposed to the risk/ risk 
source? 
not exposed highly exposed 
6 Involuntary In how far you are taking this risk voluntarily? voluntarily involuntarily 
7 Control/Uncontrollable To what extent negative consequences can be prevented by 
personal skills or taking care? 
uncontrollable easy to control 
8 Severity of 
consequences 
If negative consequences appear, how severe they would be? not fatal very fatal 
9 Possibility of death May this risk source cause death? impossible definitely to expect 
10 Catastrophic potential Do negative consequences appear timely distributed (chronic 
risk) or do they affect many persons at once (catastrophic 
risk)? 
chronic catastrophic 
11 Fear(*) Do you personally feel afraid about the risk/ risk source? not afraid very much afraid 
12 Personal probability* How do you judge the probability that you are personally affected by negative consequences of this risk source? 
very unlikely very likely 
13 Personal harm* How do you judge thereby the possible negative 
consequences for you? 
no negative 
consequences 
very much negative 
consequences 
14 High risk to future 
generations 
To what extent negative consequences could occur to future 
generations? 
no negative 
consequences 
very much negative 
consequences 
15 Dread/ Threat To what extent the risk is a threat for you? no threat dominant threat 
16 Weighting of 
probability and harm** 
Would you judge the amount of risk rather by the probability 
or the (maximal) possible harm? 
probability harm 
17 Personal benefit* To what extent to you expect positive consequences for 
yourself? 
no positive 
consequences 
very much positive 
consequences 
18 Societal benefit* To what extent to you expect positive consequences for the 
society? 
no positive 
consequences 
very much positive 
consequences 
19 Equitable distribution 
of benefit and risk 
In how far risks and benefits are equitable distributed 
between different groups? 
unfair distribution equitable 
distribution 
20 Personal risk** To what extent, do you think, there is a health risk for 
yourself? 
no risk high risk 
 
21 Acceptance** In how far you can accept the risk resulting from the risk 
source? 
I can not accept I can accept very 
well 
* These are additional characteristics, which were not used by Slovic et al. 1980 or Slovic, 1987 (*) 
** These items were not included in the factor analysis. They were used as dependent variables in regression analysis. 
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3.3. RESULTS 
3.3.1. Classical perspective: Aggregating over participants 
Table III shows the means and the standard deviations of the perceived health risk and 
the risk acceptance for the risk sources. The perceived risk is higher for the “classical” risk such 
as traffic (M= 3.88), smoking (M= 3.50), and nuclear energy (M= 3.00) than for the ultra-risks. 
The consumption of genetically modified food is perceived the less risky (M= 2.46). Although 
traffic is perceived as the highest risk it is very well accepted (M= 3.38). Only cellular phone 
has higher values for the acceptance (3.74). Heavy-metal soil contamination (M= 2.31) and 
nuclear energy (M= 2.48) have the lowest acceptance. The relatively high standard deviations of 
perceived risk and risk acceptance for smoking (SDperceived risk= 1.43, SDacceptance= 1.40) and for 
consumption of beef (SDperceived risk= 1.36, SDacceptance= 1.38) can probably be explained by 
polarising the sample by smokers versus non-smokers and vegetarians versus non-vegetarians.  
 
Tab. III: Means and standard deviations of Emotional involvement, Perceived risk, and 
Acceptance for different risk sources.  
 Perceived risk Acceptance 
Risk sources M SD M SD 
Traffic 3.88 .92 3.38 1.15 
Smoking 3.50 1.43 2.82 1.40 
Nuclear plant 3.00 1.32 2.48 1.26 
Genetically modified food 2.46 1.17 2.57 1.30 
Cellular phone 2.96  1.18 3.74  1.21 
Consumption of beef 2.54 1.36 2.68 1.38 
Heavy metal contaminated soil 2.62 1.25 2.31 1.16 
Concerning the weighting of harm versus probability (see Table IV), a mean above 3 
indicates weighting in favour of harm, a mean below 3 indicates weighting in favour of 
probability. Whereas participants rated the component of harm as more important for the risk 
judgement of nuclear energy (M= 3.62) and smoking (M= 3.37), they rated the probability as 
more important for the risk judgement of cellular phone (M= 2.59) and consumption of beef 
(M= 2.61). Participants are not very much interested in having more information about smoking 
(M= 1.86) or traffic (M= 2.21), but they express a desire for additional information about 
genetically modified food (M= 3.54) and heavy-metal soil contamination (M= 3.28). 
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Tab. IV: Means and standard deviations of Weightings and desire for additional information for 
different risk sources. 
 Weighting (harm versus 
probability) 
Desire for additional information 
Risk Sources M SD M SD 
Traffic 3.17  1.45 2.21 1.22 
Smoking 3.37 1.45 1.86 1.21 
Nuclear Plant 3.62 1.45 3.26 1.16 
Cellular phone 2.59 1.36 2.91 1.46 
Heavy metal soil contamination 3.05 1.37 3.28 1.19 
Consumption of beef 2.61 1.35 2.52 1.24 
Genetically modified food 3.06 1.40 3.54 1.25 
Note: Weighting of 3 means that both components probability and harm should be taken in the same way into 
consideration. Weighting above 3 means that to the component of harm should be paid more attention than to the 
probability. Weighting below 3 means that to the component of probability should be paid more attention than to the 
harm. 
 
In a first factor analysis we aggregated over participants by taking the mean values for 
each characteristic and risk source (see Table V). Three factors with an Eigenvalue above 1 
could be found. The first factor had high factor loadings for personal harm, possibility of death, 
severity of harm, fear, emotional involvement, and threat. We called this first factor in analogy 
to Slovic et al. (1985) dread. The second factor loaded high in societal benefit, personal benefit, 
fairness, and personal exposure. The third factor control had high factor loadings for control, 
catastrophic potential (negatively), voluntary, and future generations (negatively). Thereby, the 
first factor explains 23%, the second 15%, and the third 14% of the variance. 
 
Tab. V: Factor scores based on means for participants. Values below .40 are not indicated. 
Analysis was performed with the Varimax Rotation Method.  
 Dread Benefit Control 
Personal harm .97   
Possibility of death .95   
Severity of consequences .93   
Fear .92   
Emotional involvement .74 .54  
Threat .73 .55  
Personal probability .64 .62  
Societal benefit  .97 .71 
Personal benefit  .97 .69 
Equitable distribution of benefit and risk  .95 .58 
Personal exposure  81 .45 
Control/Uncontrollable   .98 
Catastrophic potential   -.86 
Involuntary  .45 .82 
High risk to future generations   -.77 
Level of knowledge .56  .73 
Familiarity .51  .69 
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Tab. VI: Factor weights of the risk sources for the three main factors. 
 Dread Benefit Control 
Cellular phone -1.36 1.44 .43 
Genetically modified food -.73 -.14 -.26 
Nuclear plant .96 .124 -1.61 
Consumption of beef (BSE) -.10 -1.00 .93 
Heavy metal contaminated soil -.79 -1.05 -.89 
Smoking .92 -.57 1.21 
Traffic 1.10 1.21 .19 
Whereas traffic, smoking, and nuclear energy have high positive weights on the factor 
dread, cellular phone, heavy metal contaminated soil, and genetically modified have high 
negative weights (see Table VI). The factor benefit is spanned by cellular phone and traffic on 
the one hand, and of heavy metal contaminated soil and consumption of beef (BSE) on the other 
hand (see Figure 1). Smoking and the consumption of beef are perceived as easy to control. 
Nuclear energy and heavy metal contaminated soil are perceived as difficult to control (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1: Factor space with the two factors dread and benefit 
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Figure 2: Factor space with the two factors dread and control 
 
3.3.2. Individual perspective: Aggregating over risk sources 
To investigate the influence of the factors on the perceived risk, the risk acceptance, the 
desire for additional information, and the weighting of harm versus dread, we performed a 
multiple regression analysis for each of these variables/factors. Whereas perceived risk (see 
Table VIII) seems to be determined by emotional concern (= .573, p< .001) and damage 
potential (= .217, p= .006), the significant predictors for risk acceptance (see Table IX) are 
emotional concern (= -.260, p= .003) and benefit (= .418, p< .001). The factors familiarity 
and control seem to have no significant influence. The five factors together explain 61.6% of the 
variance for the perceived risk and 49.9% of the variance for the risk acceptance. 
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Tab. VII: Factor scores based on means for the risk sources. Values below .40 are not indicated. 
Analysis was performed with the Varimax Rotation Method. 
Emotional 
concern 
Damage 
potential 
Benefit Familiarity Control 
Threat .80     
Emotional Involvement .76     
Fear .75     
Personal exposure .73     
Personal probability .66     
Personal harm .43     
Possibility of death  .74    
Catastrophic potential  .65    
Severity of consequences  .64    
High risk to future generations .44 .46    
Personal benefit   .83   
Societal benefit   .78   
Involuntary   .59   
Familiarity    .83  
Level of knowledge    .83  
Control/Uncontrollable     .69 
Equitable distribution of benefit and risk     .69 
Tab. VIII: Multiple linear regression model with the 5 factors resulting of the factor analysis as 
independent variables and perceived risk as the dependent variable; R2adjusted = .616. 
 Perceived risk 
Predictors  p
Emotional concern .573 <.001 
Damage potential .217 .006 
Benefit -.014 .862 
Familiarity .058 .460 
Control .057 .853 
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Tab. IX: Multiple linear regression model with the 5 factors resulting of the factor analysis as 
independent variables and risk acceptance as the dependent variable; R2adjusted = .499. 
 Acceptance 
Predictors  p
Emotional concern -.260 .003 
Damage potential -.057 .508 
Benefit .418 <.001 
Familiarity -.052 .541 
Control .033 .696 
Emotional concern is the only significant predictor for the desire for additional 
information (= .389, p< .001; see Table X). The weighting of harm versus probability is best 
predicted by emotional concern (= .372, p< .001) and damage potential (= .236, p= .008). 
This means, that the more people are emotionally concerned and the higher they perceive a 
damage potential, the more they weight in favour of the component of harm in their judgements. 
The five factors explain 42.6% of the variance for the desire of additional information and 
47.6% of the variance for the weighting of harm versus probability. 
 
Tab. X Multiple linear regression model with the 5 factors resulting of the factor analysis as 
independent variables and desire for additional information as the dependent variable; R2adjusted = .426. 
 Desire for additional information 
Predictors  P
Emotional concern .389 <.001 
Damage potential -.131 .145 
Benefit .050 .573 
Familiarity -.040 .656 
Control .094 .297 
Looking at the control variables, participants who owned a cellular phone (N= 88)
accepted more the risk of cellular phones (M= 3.97) than participants who did not own a cellular 
phone (N= 24, M= 2.87, t= -4.138, p< .001). There was also a positive correlation between the 
importance of cellular phone and its acceptance (r= .50, p< .001). Participants who were 
member of a 'green' organisation (N= 15) accepted less the risk of cellular phone (t= 2.858, p=
.005). They were also more emotionally involved in this topic (t= -2.476, p= .015), and in the 
topic of genetically modified food (t= -2.623, p= .010). Whereas vegetarians (N= 22) did not 
differ in the risk acceptance of the consumption of beef, participants who told that they are not 
consume beef at the moment (N= 40) had lower values in the risk acceptance of consumption of 
beef (t= 2.369, p= .015m). Smokers (N= 25) perceived the risk of smoking higher (M= 4.64)
than non-smokers did (N= 87, M= 3.17, t= -5.022, p< .001). On the other hand, smokers 
accepted the risk of smoking more (M= 3.52) than non-smokers (M= 2.56, t= -4.641, p< .001). 
No significant age or gender effects were found. 
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Tab. XI Multiple linear regression model with the 5 factors resulting of the factor analysis as 
independent variables and the weighting of harm versus probability as the dependent variable; R2adjusted 
= .474. 
 Weighting of harm versus probability 
Predictors  P
Emotional concern .372 <.001 
Damage potential .236 .008 
Benefit -.04 .648 
Familiarity -.02 .800 
Control .146 .098 
3.4. DISCUSSION 
In the classical factor analysis we could identify the three factors dread, benefit, and 
control. Dread was rather identical with the dread risk factor of Slovic et al. (1985). The second 
and third factors were different. As expected the two different ways to aggregate the data 
produces different factor structures. On the individual level, we found 5 factors. Whereas on the 
classical over participants aggregated level dread is the first factor like in the original studies 
(e.g., Slovic et al., 1985; Slovic, 1987), on the individual level the factor dread was split into 
two components. We called the first factor emotional concern with high factor loadings of 
threat, emotional involvement, fear, and perceived exposure. The second factor was damage 
potential with high factor loadings of catastrophic potential or fatal consequences. Whereas the 
factor emotional concern reflects the personal and emotional side of the individual risk 
perception process, the factor damage potential considers the visible parts of dread. Thus, a 
distinction between the perceived potential damage (Factor 2) and the emotional involvement 
(Factor 1) must be made. The first factor reflects the importance of emotional characteristics/ 
processes in judging a risk and thus support the results of other researcher stressing emotional 
aspects (e.g., Finucane et al., 2000; Schwarzer, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lopes, 1987; 
McDaniels et al., 1995; Karger & Wiedemann, 1998; Baron et al., 2000; Rundmo, 2002; 
Sjöberg, 1998; MacGregor, 1991).  
In our studies, in both of the analysis methods, benefit was an own strong factor, i.e. the 
second and the third factor. Our results are in contradiction to Slovic et al. (1980, 1985), who 
did not include benefit as a characteristic, but in line with Borcherding et al. (1986). Benefit and 
the perceived risk were equal predictors for risk acceptance in their study. Also other authors 
pointed the influence of the perceived benefit on risk perception and acceptance (Otway & von 
Winterfeldt, 1982; Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; McDaniels et al., 1995; Finucane et al., 2000). 
Nevertheless, factor solutions were quite similar for the two analysis methods, with a 
first factor dread (split or not), following by benefit and control. This supports the thesis of 
Jungermann & Slovic (1993) that individual differences are a result of a different weighting of 
the factors, but the factor structure itself stays the same. Even the fact that the analysis produced 
different numbers of factors could be probably explained with the relative small number of risk 
sources, on the one hand, and the large number of participants, on the other hand, included in 
the analysis. However, the results of factor analysis are a function of the chosen characteristics, 
the chosen risks, the formulation of the items, the analysis method, and probably the sample as 
well. 
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Similar to the studies of Gardner & Gould (1989), Sjöberg (1993), Holtgrave & Weber 
(1993), Borcherding, Rohrmann & Eppel (1986), and Karger & Wiedemann (1998) lay people 
do also consider harm and probability in their risk judgements. Thereby, in our study the role of 
qualitative characteristics, particularly of emotional concern, was more important. But this could 
be the result of the risk sources we chose. Whereas participants weighted more the probability 
for the risk sources cellular phone and BSE, participants weighted more the harm for the risk 
sources nuclear energy and smoking. 
The more a risk is high on the factor emotional concern and damage potential the more 
people focus on the component of harm and the less they consider the probability. This could be 
called the dread-effect. Gigerenzer (2004) gave a good but also sad example, how this dread-
effect can even lead to higher risk behaviour. He could show that the numbers of victims died in 
car accidents because they stopped flying after the September 11 2003 were higher than the 
number of victims died on September 11. They avoid flying, because they had this horrible 
event in mind, but neglected the probability. Thus, this dread-effect has some important 
implications for risk communication. The fact that the desire for additional information is only 
determined by emotional concern is also noteworthy. 
Concerning the risk sources, the ultra-low risks were contrasting the classical risks 
particularly in the factor of dread. Ultra-low risks had lower values in dread and they were - 
except cellular phone -lower or indifferent with respect to benefit. Cellular phone had the 
highest values for benefit and for the acceptance. Cellular phone seems to have a very high 
acceptance in the population of high-school students in Switzerland. Regarding the factor 
control, ultra-low risks and classical risks showed a broad variance. In conclusion, ultra-low 
risks are not perceived as high risks due to low values in the factor dread. The acceptance of 
these risks is dependent mainly of the perceived benefit. 
The present study could give a brief insight into the psychometric paradigm and how 
qualitative characteristics can influence risk judgements. In our view, individual processes in 
risk judgements, particularly the role of emotions, should be further stressed in future research. 
Also there should be made further progresses to draw conclusions from the risk perception 
research and implement them in the risk communication context. 
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Abstract 
Soil contaminated with heavy metals is a salient example of environmental risk. Consumption 
of vegetables cultivated on contaminated soil or direct ingestion of soil by small children can 
damage health. In contrast to other kinds of pollution or risks such as air pollution or exposure 
to ozone, the individual risk concerning soil contamination is highly dependent on the way one 
is exposed to the local source of risk. Thus, we wanted to know if risk perception varies 
according to the level of exposure. A quasi-experimental, questionnaire-based study was 
conducted in a community of the North West of Switzerland, where the soil is widely 
contaminated. The level of contamination varies with the distance from the source of the 
contamination, a metal processing plant. We investigated the perception of risk of heavy metal 
contaminated soil by inhabitants with high-exposure levels (N = 27) and those with low-
exposure levels (N = 30). Both groups judged the risk for oneself similarly whereas the low-
exposure group, when compared to the high-exposure group, judged perceived the risk for other 
affected people living in their community to be higher. Besides this exposure effect, risk 
perception is mainly determined by emotional concerns. Participants with higher scores in self-
estimated knowledge tend to provide low risk judgments, were less interested in further 
information, showed low emotional concern and thus high risk acceptance. Contrarily, actual 
knowledge showed no correlation with one of theses variables. Judgments on the need for 
decontamination are determined by risk perception, less application of dissonance-reducing 
heuristics, and commitment to sustainability. The desire for additional information is not 
affected by missing knowledge but is affected by emotional concerns. 
 
Key Words: Risk perception, environmental risk, heavy metal contamination, emotional 
concerns 
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4.1. Introduction 
The risk assessment of experts is only part of the truth in a risk dialog. The risk 
perception of concerned people is the other. This distinction can be traced to the discourse on 
risk communication (1-3). However, in contrast to other kinds of environmental risks such as air 
pollution or exposure to the ozone hole, the individual risk perception and risk acceptance of 
soil contamination is highly dependent on a person’s exposure (or not) to the local risk source. 
Slovic et al. (4) already included personal exposure as a determinant of risk perception. Exposure 
had a positive impact on perceived risk and was part of the first factor, dread, in the early studies 
of Slovic et al. The second factor was unknown risk. In another study by Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein (5), personal exposure and the number of exposed people constituted an own third 
factor. Marks and Winterfeldt (6) named the positive correlation of personal exposure and 
perceived risk as the not-in-my-backyard phenomena. But is the effect of exposure really so 
clear? How do exposed people perceive the risk? We conducted our study using a real life 
situation. Without doubt, a critical issue is how long people are exposed and how they react 
when they become aware of the exposure. If, for instance, people have lived on contaminated 
soil for years and do not (want to) change their residence, then we assume that dissonance-
reduction (7- 9) is at work and leads to an increase in the acceptance of the risk.  
Whether a given risk seems acceptable is negatively correlated with the perceived risk 
and positively correlated with the perceived benefits. The risk acceptance becomes positive if 
the perceived benefits are outbalancing the perceived negative and harmful outcomes. 
According to Slovic risk perception is a rather general concept and “refers to various kinds of 
attitudes and judgments”(10). The study of risk perception includes the investigation of the 
cognitive and affective processes involved and relies on risk judgments that are given by 
different populations of students and citizen groups.  
In a previous questionnaire-based study, Weber et al. (11) compared the risk judgments of 
40 inhabitants of Dornach with 40 people living in comparable, but not contaminated, 
communities. The people exposed to contamination knew and accepted that there was a problem 
in the area, but the risk itself, or the risk in general, was perceived to be lower by those exposed 
to contamination than by those not exposed. 
In the study by Weber et al. (11), a member of the project staff was present when people 
filled out the questionnaire. During these rather interview-like meetings they collected some 
additional qualitative information. Participants were more than happy to speak about their local 
contamination problem and they were quite open in expressing their opinions. Based on this 
additional qualitative information certain variables could be identified, which seemed to be 
relevant for a better understanding of people’s risk perception (12), such as 1) exposure 
differences in the village of Dornach itself, and individual differences in 2) knowledge, 3) 
emotional concern, and 4) the use of heuristics. However, these qualitative impressions did not 
allow one to draw any conclusions concerning how far these variables are related to each other 
or the influence they have on risk perception. Thus, the main goal of our study is to investigate 
the influence of these proposed variables on risk perception in an exploratory and quantitative 
way. 
The relationship between exposure and risk perception respectively risk acceptance in 
Dornach itself was not clear in the study of Weber et al. (11). They suspected that people who 
were living in close proximity to the metal factory, and were thus exposed most, rated the risk 
similarly or even lower than people living at some distance from the plant in an only marginally 
contaminated area. Contrary to the study of Weber et al. (11), which investigated exposed versus 
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non-exposed people from different communities, this study compares minimally exposed and 
highly exposed people within the same community. Because the level of contamination varies 
substantially in Dornach, the effective exposure and, thus the potential risk, varies for different 
inhabitants. This may, therefore, have an influence on the risk perception. 
In a series of studies (11, 13) a great deal of variation  the knowledge people had of the 
contamination problem was observed. In the case of Dornach information was provided by 
newspaper articles, through a newsletter, and in an informational meeting organized by the 
community council of Dornach. Although information was easily available for everyone in the 
same way, people differed considerably in their knowledge of the soil contamination problem. 
Some people were very well informed; they knew, for example, which heavy metals were 
included, the paths through which health damage could be caused, or which vegetables they 
should avoid growing, and subsequently eating, in contaminated gardens. Other people were 
missing some information or even had wrong ideas about the risk. They believed, for example, 
that the main problem resulting from soil contamination is the bad quality of ground water. 
Nevertheless, self-estimated knowledge and the desire for further information seemed to vary 
independently of the actual knowledge people had. In addition, they were unaware of the 
influence of knowledge on risk perception. This is consistent with other studies (14) showing that 
it is not actual knowledge, but rather self-estimated knowledge, that has an important influence 
on risk perception. 
The extent to which people were emotionally involved in the problem of the local soil 
contamination also seemed to play an important role in the way they perceived the risk and 
made their judgments. Whereas some people were heavily emotionally involved and concerned 
about the situation, others did not show any concern and paid little attention to the situation. 
Emotionally involved people rated the risk more highly than less emotionally involved people. 
Other authors (15-23) have already pointed out the importance of considering an emotional 
component in risk perception. In brief, the main results of these studies were that worry 
increases the perceived risk. Schwarz (16) categorized the emotional impact on decision making 
according to the different steps in the decision process. Lerner and Keltner (17) noted that the 
influence of emotions on judgments is rather emotion specific. 
During the five-year project on soil risk in Dornach in which the authors were involved 
(24, 25), we met a lot of people whose arguments were based on simple heuristics, which – from 
an environmental science perspective – seemed to be rather weak. These arguments, while 
sounding in some way logical, usually did not contain any scientific reasoning. Some people 
mentioned that there was an inhabitant in Dornach, who lived close to the plant, ate vegetables 
from his own garden, was always very healthy, and died very old. The more frequent 
appearance of snails on the site was another argument people used to argue that the risk of soil 
contaminated with heavy metals in Dornach could not be so bad. These are only two examples 
of heuristics, with which we were confronted. The function or the goal of these heuristics could 
be a reduction of cognitive dissonance (7). The thoughts that people have in mind are probably of 
the nature: A risk exists at the place where I live – either I change my place of residence or the 
risk is not that bad. As far as we know, no people moved away due to soil contamination. Thus, 
we called these arguments dissonance-reducing heuristics. One mode of dissonance reduction is 
trivialization (9). The arguments used by the residents of Dornach can be interpreted as a type of 
trivialization. 
To obtain a better understanding of the aforementioned processes we constructed a 
questionnaire to record risk judgments and foundations of risk perception. In addition to the 
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already mentioned variables of knowledge, emotional concern, and dissonance-reducing 
heuristics, the questionnaire included questions on sustainability. The reason for this is that a 
commitment towards sustainability seems to be essential with respect to gaining votes for soil 
cleanup measures as found by Weber et al. (11). Whereas Weber et al. (11) described the risk of 
soil contamination with certain characteristics taken from factor analysis (26) and compared it to 
other risk sources, the main focus of this study was to gain a better understanding of the 
individual processes underlying risk perception and risk acceptance. Furthermore, differences in 
coping with risk between people with high-exposure levels and those with low-exposure levels 
were explored. 
According to the argumentation and theoretical considerations outlined above, the 
following research questions can be formulated. 1) What influence does exposure have on the 
risk perception of heavy metal contaminated soil and on the need for decontamination? 2) What 
influence do emotional concerns have on the risk perception of heavy metal contaminated soil 
and on the need for decontamination? 3) To what extent are exposure and emotional concern 
related to each other? What role is played by the knowledge components of 4) actual 
knowledge, 5) self-estimated knowledge, and 6) the desire for additional information? In which 
way do 7) dissonance-reducing heuristics and 8) thoughts about sustainability affect risk 
judgments? 
 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. The case 
The problem of heavy metal contaminated soil exists at many industrial sites all over the world 
(27). One example of such a contaminated site in Switzerland is the community of Dornach, 
which is situated near Basel in northeast Switzerland and has approximately 6,000 inhabitants. 
In Dornach, the soil is heavily contaminated with heavy metals (28). The primary cause for the 
contamination is a metal processing plant, which has been in operation since 1895. The 
installation of modern filtering systems in the early 1990s inhibits a further increase of 
contamination. Therefore, the soil contamination in Dornach is representative of refuse dumps 
(24, 29).
The soil is particularly contaminated with cadmium, zinc and copper, with cadmium 
having some risk potential (30, 31). In Dornach, the health risk is not very high because of the 
medium to moderate concentrations and because of the small soluble fraction of cadmium in the 
soil. Thus, acute intoxication can be excluded. However, since the total content of cadmium is 
relatively high, a health risk cannot be excluded given any long-term exposure (32). Chronic 
cadmium poisoning can result in kidney malfunctions and cancer. 
There are different paths with respect to how the pollutants can arrive within the human 
organism (33). The main pathways are 1) soil ingestion by infants, as they sometimes swallow 
larger amounts of soil material while playing outdoors, 2) consumption of the meat of animals, 
which grazed in the contaminated area, and 3) consumption of vegetables cultivated on local 
contaminated soil. The consumption of tuber plants like celeriac should be particularly avoided, 
since these types of plants accumulate a notable amount of heavy metals from the soil. In the 
case of Dornach only the first and third possible pathways are relevant. This is because the 
consumption of locally grown vegetables and the presence of children in the family can be seen 
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as indicators for personal exposure. Therefore, we assessed these variables and controlled their 
influence on other variables. 
However, consequences are uncertain and, if they arise, do so with a large temporal delay. 
Experts are uncertain of whether, and if so the extent to which, a health risk needs to be 
considered in the real-world case of Dornach though the risk is relative, e.g., due to high pH 
values which lowers the bioavailability of heavy metals to plants (34). Even if the risk of 
contaminated soil in Dornach is unclear, it is certainly not zero, at least in the areas with the 
highest concentrations. Moreover, the heavy metals will not disappear from the soil in the near 
future. Without decontamination, the problem of contaminated soil (and restricted soil use) will 
be bequeathed to forthcoming generations. 
4.2.2. The design of the study 
A quasi-experimental study investigated the perception of risk of heavy metal contaminated soil 
by people living in Dornach with either high or low exposure levels. These two groups were 
specified on the basis of a contamination map of cadmium (35). The map of contaminated land in 
Dornach (see Figure 1) clearly shows that the level of contamination is correlated with the 
distance to the metal processing plant. The people in the high-exposure group lived in close 
proximity to the plant (up to a distance of approximately 350 m) where the estimated 
concentration of cadmium is 2 mg/kg soil or more and the probability of exceeding a threshold 
value of 2 mg/kg soil is at least .80. The people in the low-exposure group lived at a distance of 
approximately 400 m to 1.4 km from the plant, where the estimated concentration of cadmium is 
less than 2 mg/kg soil. We excluded people living far away from the metal processing plant 
and/or not on a contaminated area (where the estimated concentration of cadmium is between 0 
– 0.5 mg/kg soil). People were unaware of their group membership, but it is commonly known 
in Dornach that the distance between one’s residence and the metal processing plant, which is 
the source of the contamination, gives an approximate idea of the relative level of 
contamination. 
While the local level of contamination and the distance between one’s home and the 
metal plant are good indicators of personal exposure, other factors need to also be considered. 
People who eat vegetables or fruits grown in their own garden or by local producers are more 
exposed than those who do not. People with small children might have a special risk to their 
family, if the uncertainties in the soil measurement are taken into account and concentrations of 
far above 10 mg Cd/kg soil are considered likely. In addition, the duration of the exposure is 
also a key factor determining the level of the risk. Therefore, questions concerning the 
consumption of locally grown vegetables, the presence of children, and how long one has lived 
in the exposed area were included in our questionnaire. 
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Figure 1. Map of cadmium contaminated land and the probability that a threshold value 
of 2 mg/kg soil is exceeded. Source: U. Schnabel, Spatial Data Management and Decision 
Making for Soil Improvement Measures (Dissertation No 15125, Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology, Zurich, 2003). 
 
4.2.3. The instrument 
We constructed a standardized questionnaire, whose questions had to be answered on an 
8-point scale. We also included some multiple-choice questions (see Table I). Partly because we 
conducted our study door-to-door and partly because we wanted to motivate as many inhabitants 
to participate as possible, we wanted to construct a rather short instrument with only a few 
meaningful items. In particular, there are very few households in the high-exposure area. Thus, 
we included rather holistic overall judgments instead of multifaceted questions examining 
various attributes. Such overall judgments should be a good way in which to encourage 
emotional involvement because of the holistic nature of emotions. We also included only overall 
judgments for the dependent variables, such as risk perception and need for decontamination. In 
fact, as far as we know from our own experience of interviews or contacts with the town council 
and other actors, these general and holistic judgments are predominant in Dornach. Thus, our 
items seem to be a good indicator for individual processes in this case. 
From a psychometric point of view, the disadvantage of single item variables or short 
scales is one of limited information on reliability. Therefore, the interpretation of the results 
concerning the strength of an effect has to be made very carefully. Nevertheless, our work can 
be seen as a pilot study in which to obtain a better understanding of the Dornach case and of 
residents’ risk perception on soil contamination. For a real robust, generalized interpretation, the 
results should probably be replicated. 
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Table I. Questionnaire items. 
Variable/Question Type 
Emotional concern 
• To what extent do you feel concerned about the contamination problem? 
• To what extent are you emotionally involved? 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
Actual knowledge 
• Which substances cause the health risk? 
• Which paths for human absorption are the most relevant ones? 
• Which vegetables or fruits should you avoid eating regularly? 
 
Multiple choice 
Multiple choice 
Multiple choice 
Self-estimated knowledge 
• Do you feel well informed about the problem? 
• How do you estimate the extent of your knowledge in comparison to other 
inhabitants of your community? 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
Desire for further information 
• 1. Do you wish you could have further information? 
 
8-point scale 
Dissonance reducing heuristics 
... To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
• There are examples of people, who lived close to the plant, ate vegetables 
from their own garden, were always very healthy, and died very old. This 
proves that the problem is not that bad. 
• The more frequent appearance of snails shows that the situation is improving. 
• Modern filter systems inhibit further contamination, thereby, solving the 
problem on a long-term basis. 
• In Eastern Europe the situation is much worse. 
• Other environmental problems are more important. 
• Mobile communication (GSM-Transmitter) is an even greater health risk. 
 
8-point scale 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
Thoughts about sustainability 
• Do you think about future generations with respect to soil contamination in 
Dornach? 
• Should the soil, as a living part of our environment, be protected? 
• Should the soil be cleaned even if there are no acute human health risks? 
 
8-point scale 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
Risk measures 
• To what extent, do you think, there is a risk for yourself? 
• To what extent, do you think, there is a risk for other inhabitants in Dornach? 
 
8-point scale 
8-point scale 
Need for decontamination 
• To what extent do you favor the decontamination of the soil? 
 
8-point scale 
Control variables 
• Do you eat vegetables or fruits grown in your own garden or produced locally?
• If you have children, what is the age of your youngest child? 
• How long have you lived in Dornach? 
• Do you live in close proximity to the metal processing plant? 
• What is your gender? 
• What is your year of birth? 
 
Yes/No 
Open response 
Open response 
Yes/No 
Multiple choice 
Open response 
As can be seen in Table I, emotional concern, related to the extent to which a person is 
concerned with the situation and feels emotionally involved, was assessed with two questions. 
These two items were highly correlated, with r = .76. Knowledge with respect to soil 
contamination was divided into three facets: actual knowledge, self-estimated knowledge, and 
the desire for further information. Actual knowledge was measured with three multiple-choice 
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questions. Participants could achieve a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 14. For 
example, we asked what the most relevant paths for human intake of the heavy metals prevalent 
in Dornach were. Self-estimated knowledge was assessed with two items, which correlated with 
r = .68. The desire for additional information was assessed with a single question. The construct 
of dissonance-reducing heuristics consisted of 6 items (Cronbach Alpha = .78), which were 
collected in a previous interview-based study (19) (see Table I). Three items examined thoughts 
concerning sustainability and the precautionary principle (e.g., “Do you think about future 
generations with respect to soil contamination in Dornach?”; Cronbach Alpha = .75). Regarding 
the dependent variable perceived risk magnitude, we focused on health risk and we 
distinguished between health risk for oneself and health risk for other inhabitants in Dornach, 
each measured with one item. A third dependent variable was the need for decontamination, 
again measured with one item. The control variables are also listed in Table I. 
 
4.2.4 Participants 
The investigation included 57 residents (33 male and 24 female) of Dornach. The low-
exposure group consisted of 30 participants and the high-exposure group consisted of 27 
participants. Unfortunately, due to the area’s small size, we were unable to obtain more 
households in the high-exposure condition. While 26 participants (96.3%) in the high-exposure 
group answered affirmatively to the question of whether or not they lived in close proximity to 
the metal processing plant, only 13 participants (43.3%) in the low-exposure group did so. 
The average age of the participants was M = 50.5 (min =18, max = 80). The majority of 
participants (45 or 78.9%) had children. The average length of time participants had been 
residents of Dornach was M = 26.8 years (SD = 20.9 years). Only people living in houses with 
gardens were included in the study and 40 of them (70.2%) consumed fruit or vegetables from 
their own garden or from local producers. There were no significant statistical differences in 
these data between the high-exposure and the low-exposure groups. 
 
4.2.5. Procedure 
The investigation took place in Dornach. The participants filled out a questionnaire, with 
one person on the project staff present to help in case participants had any questions. After 
filling out the questionnaire, the participants received a small box of chocolates for their efforts. 
 
53
4.3. Results 
The dependent variable risk perceptions/judgments was analyzed using a 2 (exposure: 
high vs. low) by 3 (emotional concern: high vs. medium vs. low) by 2 (risk object: oneself vs. 
other) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor (see Table II). Exposure did not have 
a direct influence on the risk judgments, as indicated by the failure to obtain a significant main 
effect (F = .01, df = 1, p = .92). In contrast, the main effect of emotional concern on risk 
judgments was significant (F = 15.9, df = 2, p < .001). The object of risk (oneself or others) was 
also significantly related to overall risk judgments (F = 30.8, df = 1, p < .001), with the risk for 
others being generally rated higher than the risk for oneself (Mrisk for oneself = 3.8, Mrisk for others = 
5.1). Emotional concern did not interact significantly with either exposure (F = .72, df = 2, p =
.49) or with risk object (F = 1.3, df = 2, p = .27). There was, however, a significant interaction 
between exposure and the object of risk (F = 7.3, df = 1, p < 0.01). More specifically, whereas 
the low-exposure group perceived and judged the risk for other people to be higher than did the 
high-exposure group as expected, ratings of the risk for oneself were not higher for the high-
exposure group than the low-exposure group (see Figure 2). Both groups perceived the risk for 
oneself similarly. No gender effects were found. 
 
Table II. ANOVA summary table for risk perception judgments with exposure, 
emotional concern and risk object (repeated measurement) as independent variables (Nhigh-exposure 
= 27, Nlow-exposure = 30). 
Source df F p
Exposure 1 .01 .921 
Emotional Concern 2 15.9 <.001 
Risk Object (risk for 
oneself vs. risk for 
others) 
1 30.8 <.001 
Exposure* Emotional 
Concern 
2 .72 .491 
Exposure* Risk Object 1 7.3 .009 
Emotional Concern* 
Risk Object 
2 1.3 .273 
Exposure* Emotional 
Concern* Risk Object 
2 .44 .648 
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Figure 2. Mean risk judgments for oneself and for other persons as a function of 
exposure. 
 
While the ANOVA revealed that emotional concern had a main effect on risk perception 
(see Table II), emotional concerndid not depend significantly on the exposure group (Mhigh-exposed 
= 3.7, Mlow-exposed = 4.6). However, a point-biserial correlation analysis revealed that exposure 
correlates significantly with emotional concern (r = .27, p < .05). While the ANOVA examines 
the interaction between exposure and emotional concern factors in influencing risk 
judgments/perceptions, the correlation analysis examines in how far these two factors are related 
to each other. Thus, there seems to be a slight tendency that residents in the high-exposure group 
are less emotionally involved than those in the low-exposure group, but this covariance of 
exposure and emotional concern does not have an effect on the risk perception. Tests for 
exposure and other variables were not significant. 
Table III presents the correlations between the different variables. Emotional concern 
correlated positively with the desire for additional information (r = .34, p < .05), with thoughts 
about sustainability (r= .38, p < .01), with risk for oneself (r= .63, p < .01) as well as risk for 
others (r= .56, p < .01), and with need for decontamination (r= .51, p < .01). It correlated 
negatively with dissonance-reducing heuristics (r= -.37, p < .01) and with self-estimated 
knowledge (r= -.31, p < .05). The implications are that people with high emotional concern are 
more likely to rate the risk as being higher, have a more pronounced need for decontamination, 
wish for more information about the problem, think more about sustainability and precaution 
issues, use less dissonance-reducing heuristics, and estimate that they know less about the 
problem. In other words, emotional concern seems to be very central to the process of risk 
perception. 
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Table III. Intercorrelations (N = 57) between variables. 
 Emotional 
concern 
Heuristics Precaution Actual 
knowledge
Self-
estimated 
knowledge
Desire for 
information
Risk for 
oneself 
Risk for 
others 
Heuristics -.37**        
Precaution .38** -.05       
Actual knowledge -.16 .11 -.02      
Self-estimated 
Knowledge 
-.31* .43** -.20 .36**     
Desire for 
Information 
.34* -.28* .34** -.11 -.35**    
Risk for oneself .63** -.21 .22 -.14 -.33* .45**   
Risk for others .56 ** -.34** .33* -.03 -.36** .37** .68**  
Need for 
decontamination 
.51** -.57** .52** -.09 -.42** .51** .38** .51** 
Note: Correlations with ** are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Correlations with * are significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed). 
 
The scores for actual knowledge covered the entire range between 0 and 14 (see Figure 
3) and are bimodally distributed. There were two notable peaks, with people being either well 
informed or poorly informed. Actual knowledge correlated with self-estimated knowledge (r =
.36, p < .01), but had no other significant relations to other variables (see Table III). On the 
other hand, self-estimated knowledge correlated negatively and significantly with perceived risk 
to oneself (r = -.33, p < .01) and to others (r = -.36, p < .01), with need of decontamination (r = -
42, p < .01), and emotional concern, as already outlined above. It correlated positively with 
actual knowledge (r = .36, p < .01) and with the use of dissonance-reducing heuristics (r = 43, p
< .01). The desire for additional information correlated most with need for decontamination (r =
51, p < .01) but also correlated significantly with all other variables excluding actual knowledge. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency distribution of actual knowledge scores. 
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To investigate which variables had the greatest influence on risk perception we used a 
multiple linear regression analysis. This analysis was made for three dependent variables: risk 
for oneself, risk for others, and need for decontamination. Non-significant independent variables 
were excluded in a stepwise fashion. Risk perception for oneself is exclusively determined by 
emotional concern (standardized = .62, t = 5.9, p < .001). The risk for others as presented in Table 
IV is determined by emotional concern (standardized = .50, t = 4.4, p < .001), self-estimated 
knowledge (standardized = -.27, t = -2.4, p < .05), and by exposure (standardized = -.24, t = -2.1, p <
.05). With R2adjusted = .39, only a small part of the variance can be explained by the independent 
variables. The need for decontamination (see Table V) is determined by the risk perceived for 
others (standardized = .21, t = 2.2, p < .05), a lower use of dissonance-reducing heuristics 
(standardized = -.47, t = -5.1, p < .001), and thoughts about sustainability (standardized = .43, t = 4.6,
p < .001). With these three predictors, 57% of the variance can be explained. 
 
Table IV. Summary of multiple linear regression analysis for variables predicting 
perceived risk for others (N = 57). R2adjusted= .322 for initial step; R2adjusted= .388 for final step. 
Standardized Beta t p 
Final Step    
Emotional concern .499 4.4 <.001 
 Self-estimated knowledge -.274 -2.4 .019 
 Exposure -.235 -2.1 .041 
Initial Step    
 Emotional concern .401 3.1 .003 
 Self-estimated knowledge -.241 -1.8 .082 
 Exposure -.191 -1.6 .109 
 Knowledge .148 1.2 .232 
 Sustainability .086 .70 .487 
 Heuristics -.061 -.47 .639 
The control variables (e.g., age, gender, consumption of locally grown vegetables or 
fruits, and presence of children) did not have any significant influence on other variables. We 
also controlled for the age of children, but we still did not find any interrelation with other 
variables. The only exception was the control variable measuring the length of time residents 
had lived in Dornach, which correlated significantly with the use of dissonance-reducing 
heuristics (r = .34, p < 0.05) and the need for decontamination (r = -.46, p < .01). The longer 
people had resided in Dornach, the more they used dissonance-reducing heuristics and the less 
they expressed a need for decontamination. 
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Table V. Summary of multiple linear regression analysis for variables predicting need 
for decontamination (N = 57). R2adjusted= .504 for initial step; R2adjusted= .573 for final step. 
 Standardized Beta t p 
Final Step    
Heuristics -.470 -5.1 <.001 
 Sustainability .425 4.6 <.001 
 Risk for others .214 2.2 .034 
Initial Step    
 Heuristics -.443 -3.8 <.001 
 Sustainability .404 3.8 <.001 
 Risk for others .137 .94 .353 
 Risk for oneself .07 .45 .657 
 Exposure -.05 -.43 .668 
 Self-estimated knowledge -.05 -.43 .670 
 Emotional concern .05 .34 .737 
 Knowledge .01 .10 .919 
4.4. Discussion 
Two interesting findings from the present research are that the high-exposure group and 
the low-exposure group do not differ in risk judgments for themselves and that people in the 
low-exposure group rated the risk for others more highly. Taken together, the implications are 
that the two exposure groups differ in their risk judgments. Fischhoff, Bostrom, and Jacobs 
Quadrel (36) have already pointed out that “asking people about risks to other people like 
themselves is not the same as asking them about their personal risk” (p. 994). The difference in 
judgments of the risks for others can be best explained using the following argumentation: 
Those who are in the low-exposure group cognize a group of others who are more exposed, 
whereas those living closer to the metal processing plant do not. While this may sound trivial, it 
is nevertheless noteworthy because the participants in the present study were unaware of their 
group membership and because the distance to the risk source was rather small (less than 2 km). 
The fact that both exposure groups similarly rated the risk for oneself could indicate a kind of 
self-regulation. That is, people are willing to accept a certain upper risk level for oneself. Above 
this level, however, people are no longer comfortable. Of course, this level varies individually, 
but because the two groups were comparable with respect to the socio-demographical variables, 
they achieved the same average.  
The absent correlation between the presence of children, the consumption of local 
produce, or the duration of the exposure with the perceived risk could also be interpreted as a 
type of self-regulation. Objectively, children, people consuming local produce, and people who 
are exposed for longer periods of time are more at risk than are others. It is likely that people 
who are initially less concerned about the risks involved are more likely to consume or to 
continue consuming vegetables or fruits grown in their own garden or grown by local producers. 
Of course, by doing so they are increasing their risk. It seems to be crucial that the risk in 
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Dornach is caused by refuse dumps, which have been in existence for several decades; the 
longer someone has been living in the contaminated area the more likely it is that he or she uses 
dissonance-reducing heuristics. The correlation between these two variables is independent of 
the age of the participant. The stress of living on contaminated soil and of being at risk for years 
is argued to initiate self-regulation so as to reduce stress to an acceptable level (37-41). Thereby, 
an emotion-focused coping was much more likely in the case of Dornach than a problem-
focused coping (42, 43), because inhabitants of Dornach did neither have sufficient information 
about the risk of the soil contamination nor about the means of soil remediation. 
As the results show, emotional concern plays a central role in personal risk perception. 
This is in line with other studies showing that emotional components (43) and personal concern 
(44) are essential in judgments of risk. Emotional concern had an influence on both risk measures 
and on judgments of the need for decontamination. As the link between the (objective) level of 
exposure and the (subjective) emotional concern is rather weak (45), the likelihood of a high level 
of emotional concern seems to depend more on other intervening variables. 
Emotional concern correlated positively with thoughts about sustainability, a desire for 
additional information and negatively with self-estimated knowledge and the use of dissonance-
reducing heuristics. Emotional concern thus seems to have some linkage with societal 
responsibility and knowledge/science based reasoning. Emotionally concerned people do not 
overweight their knowledge, i.e., they do not claim to know more about the problem than they 
do. Another interpretation for the negative correlation with self-estimated knowledge is that they 
underestimate their knowledge. Emotionally concerned people also use less simple heuristics. 
These heuristics seem to be a strategy for reducing emotional concern. People who cannot deal 
with negative emotions, such as worry or insecurity, are more prone to using dissonance-
reducing heuristics. As people exposed to contamination cannot escape or reduce the objective 
risk as long as they live in Dornach, this dissonance is likely to be reduced using a cognitive 
strategy. As the application of the heuristics can be considered as means to cognitively devalue 
the risk. Thus, given the ongoing exposure of the inhabitants to the contaminated soil, which 
was not (yet) planned to be remediated by the public authorities, is consistent with the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (7, 9) as dissonance can be dissolved by downrating the environmental risk. 
The different impact and role of actual knowledge and self-estimated knowledge on risk 
judgments for oneself and for others, for the need of decontamination and for cognitive 
processes is diverse. Inhabitants with self–estimated knowledge judged the risk for oneself and 
others, low and provided consequently also low rating on the need of decontamination. This 
high level of risk acceptance of these inhabitants is accompanied by a more frequent use of 
(erroneous) dissonance-reducing heuristics, a low need for information and low judgments of 
emotional concern. Contrarily, actual knowledge showed no significant correlation with any of 
these variables. These data suggest that people who think that they know all about and accepted 
the environmental risk seem to avert themselves by information processing that could refute 
their believe in the low environmental risk.  
Also other authors have also observed this missing link between actual knowledge and 
risk perception (14). Whereas the negative correlation we found between self-estimated 
knowledge and judgments of risk is consistent with some studies (4), other studies report a 
positive correlation between risk perception and self-estimated knowledge (46). This nature of the 
correlation may depend on the type of risk and on whether the risk is known or unknown. If the 
risk is known, a high level of self-estimated knowledge may result in a feeling of control over 
the risk, thereby reducing the risk perception (21, 47, 48). In line with this, Frewer et al. (49) found a 
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positive correlation between perceived knowledge and perceived control. On the other hand, if 
the risk is new and unknown, a high level self-estimated knowledge may represent a better 
awareness of the risk. This can be explained by the availability heuristic (50, 51). Another 
explanation is that the increase in actual knowledge through being given new information 
increases participants’ risk ratings (13). The logic or the mechanism behind these differences may 
be similar to the one described above with respect to the dissonance-reducing heuristics. The 
high correlation between the use of dissonance-reducing heuristics and self-estimated 
knowledge suggests that people may see these heuristics as a type of knowledge. Moreover, 
actual knowledge does not correlate with the desire for additional information in contrast to self-
estimated knowledge, which correlates negatively, and emotional concern, which correlates 
positively. 
Another interpretation of the missing influence of the extent of actual knowledge on 
people’s risk perception could be a failure in risk communication. Local authorities and other 
actors may have failed to communicate the risk and any important knowledge in an adequate 
manner. Due to this inadequate risk communication and the absence of knowledge about the 
situation (particularly the knowledge of how to deal with the situation) other factors, such as 
emotions and stress-reducing strategies, have begun to dominate most aspects of the risk 
perception process. Mental modeling (52) could potentially be an appropriate tool for application 
in this community. Additionally, greater and closer participation of inhabitants in the risk 
dialogue would certainly be advantageous. 
The need for decontamination or willingness to act are conceived a consequence of 
negative states of risk acceptance. We postulate that an involuntary exposure to high risks is 
accompanied by the objective to get rid of it.  The need for decontamination is positively related 
to risk perception, particularly to the risk people see for others, thoughts about sustainability, 
and negatively with dissonance-reducing heuristics. The correlation of the need of 
decontamination with risk perception is quite high. The influence of risk perception on people’s 
desire for risk reduction has been empirically validated by many studies (53-55), but is sometimes 
also doubted and critically discussed (56-58).
From an environmental risk management and risk communication point of view it is 
interesting to study which perceived benefits affect risk acceptance. The data of this study 
suggest that people who include thoughts about sustainability and precaution issues in their 
judgments have a stronger need for decontamination. This influence of thoughts about 
sustainability is in line with findings of other studies (11, 13, 37). On the other hand, the use of 
dissonance-reducing heuristics decreases the need for decontamination. This influence of 
dissonance-reducing heuristics on the need to do something about the risk has to be considered 
within the context of risk communication or prevention of risk-taking behavior. Dissonance-
reducing heuristics may make people ‘cognitively immune’ to risk reduction arguments. 
Admittedly, the need for decontamination is also correlated with emotional concern, but in the 
regression analysis, emotional concern was not a significant predictor for decontamination. Its 
influence seems to be moderated by risk perception. 
The present study is a good example of combining an environmental case study with 
basic psychological research using a quasi-experimental design. In contrast to rather descriptive 
and static approaches such as the psychometric paradigm (24, 44), we focused on the process of 
individual risk perception. We were able to identify some important variables. The correlations 
we found between our variables and the risk measurements are consistent with other studies and 
are not a new finding. However, our study investigated these variables in an integrated manner 
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so as to observe the relative importance of each as well as their interaction, and we did this in 
the context of a real-world case study (59). Since we used rather holistic overall judgments as 
opposed to multifaceted scales and because our sample only consisted of 57 participants, a 
replication with another case would be advantageous. 
The effect of exposure or how people deal with being exposed seems to be a complex 
topic. Based on the findings of our study, dissonance-reducing heuristics seem to be an 
important issue in risk communication. Furthermore, the dissemination of information on risk is 
no guarantee that the perceived risk will be judged appropriately. In this context, we consider 
the emotional impact to be central to risk perception. We further believe that emotional concern 
will go beyond a simple affect heuristic (60). We thus suggest that emotional concern and its 
relation to risk perception and risk management, in particular to the willingness to act or to 
support soil remediation programs, should be stressed in future research. Thereby, the role of 
emotions could be further specified (e.g., positive and negative emotions). Also the conditions 
and effects of a problem-focused versus emotion-focussed coping with an environmental risk 
could be of major interest. 
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5. Exposure, Emotional Concerns, and Information Processing in 
Environmental Risk Perception 
 
Dirk Grasmück, Michael Hürlimann, and Roland W. Scholz (submitted) 
 
Abstract 
Previous quasi-experimental studies compared judgments of exposed and non-exposed people 
on heavy metal contaminated sites. These studies identified relevant variables of risk perception 
on soil contamination such as exposure, emotional concerns, self-estimated knowledge, and the 
use of dissonance-reducing heuristics. The present study analyses the impact of these variables 
in an experimental "microworld" setting. 60 participants were confronted with heavy metal soil 
contamination. Depending upon experimental condition, participants provided risk judgments 
for different scenarios either in the role of an exposed layperson, a non-exposed layperson or an 
expert. Probability and harm were varied. The data analysis revealed that participants additively, 
as opposed to multiplicatively, integrated the information on harm and probability. Exposure 
had no direct influence on risk judgments. Emotional concern had a significant direct influence 
on risk judgments and significantly interacted with harm. Emotionally concerned subjects also 
displayed a more pronounced desire for additional information, used less dissonance reducing 
heuristics and were more likely to process information using an intuitive mode of thinking. As 
such, the intuitive mode of thinking and the analytic mode of thinking differed in the extent of 
their influence on risk judgments. 
 
Key Words: Environmental risk, heavy metal contamination, risk perception, information 
integration, emotional concerns 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the work of Laplace(1), mathematical definitions of risk have basically included 
events with negative outcomes occurring with a certain probability. In addition to this approach, 
risk perception research has identified qualitative aspects such as voluntariness, controllability, 
or catastrophic potential(2) as being important. A risk source is perceived less risky if people are 
voluntarily exposed, feel as if they have control over the risk, or do not see the possibility of a 
catastrophe. Using a factor-analytic approach, Slovic(3,4) reduced these qualitative characteristics 
to the two main factors of "dread risk" and "unknown risk". The traditional psychometric 
paradigm is characterised by some severe weak methodological points. One is the problem of 
aggregating individual data and studying average profiles of risk perception(5,6). Another is the 
factor-analytic approach, which does not reveal the cognitive processes underlying risk 
judgments. Given the fulfilment of certain prerequisites, factor analysis can be an appropriate 
method for reducing the universe of variables to a few dimensions but is still reveals little about 
the underlying psychological processes, functionality or even the goals of subjects. By the 
middle of the previous century Thurstone(7), a father of the factor analysis, already considered 
this procedure to be a tool for providing only a very first map of the investigation area. 
Proponents of the psychometric approach argue that, in addition to probability and harm, 
qualitative and subjective components have to be incorporated in the study of risk perception(3,4).
Yet, if we wish to learn more about the processes involved in risk judgments, we need to go 
beyond the classical psychometric approach. One extension is to broaden the space of risk 
cognition(8) and to consider risk cognition as being an activity based on multiple cognitive 
representations and qualitatively different cognitive processes. According to Scholz & Tietje(8),
representations of risk situations range from numerical representations(9) (e.g., statistics such as 
frequencies or measures of variance), through semantic aspects and representations (e.g., 
voluntariness, dread and episodic risk knowledge), to prototypical pictorial representations (e.g., 
roulette wheels or snowflakes linked to Laplace or Geometric probability). An interesting 
question in this context concerns the role these various elements play in the perception of 
environmental risk perception and how different information is integrated. 
Previous research on probability judgments(10,11), decision making(12,13), and problem 
solving(14), suggests that it is reasonable to differentiate between an intuitive and an analytic 
mode of thinking. Each mode is characterised by different features of cognitive representations 
and different cognitive processes. These features can be measured; for example, when analysing 
think-aloud protocols(8). Thus, three features (of ten) characterising analytic thinking are: (a) 
conscious information acquisition, selection, and processing, (b) sequential, linear, step-by-step, 
ordered cognitive activity and (c) high consciousness. In contrast, intuitive thinking features 
include: (a) preconscious information acquisition, (b) understanding through feeling and 
empathy, and (c) sudden, parallel processing of a global field of knowledge. A critical 
proposition of this research is that emotions elicit the mode of thought and, as such, a question 
investigated in this paper is the extent to which risk cognition is influenced by or interacts with 
the emotional state or dispositions of the agent.  
The role of emotions in risk perception and decision making was the subject of intense 
investigation in the previous decade(15-23). One of the main findings of this research was the 
positive correlation between worry or fear and risk measures. People who are worried about a 
certain risk provided higher risk ratings. Finucane et al.(24) labelled the influence of emotions on 
risk perception the affect heuristic. From our point of view, emotional impacts should neither be 
reduced to a global tendency nor to a simple heuristic. We rather think that there are complex 
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interactions between two systems: emotions and (risk) cognition. Emotional involvement has an 
influence on information processing as it was shown with the heuristic-systematic model(25,26) 
and on information processing underlying risk judgments(27).
According to Lerner & Keltner(16) not only worry or fear have an influence on risk 
judgments, but that also other emotions show. In our study we focus the investigation of 
negative emotional involvement on the process of environmental risk cognition. Some insights 
into the cognitive processes underlying individual risk perception have been gained in quasi-
experimental studies on risk perception in the case of soil contamination in Dornach. Dornach, a 
medium-sized village near Basel in north-west Switzerland(28), served as a case in a ten-year 
research program investigating the assessment and perception of soil contamination(29-32).
Dornach has one of the highest levels of heavy metal contamination, especially cadmium, in 
Switzerland(33,31). Comparative studies have shown that this concentration of cadmium could 
probably lead to negative health consequences in the long term(34,35). Possible paths through 
which the absorption of heavy metal could occur include the consumption from locally 
cultivated vegetables, particular tuber plants such as celeriac, or the swallowing of soil, as is 
often the case with infants(36).
In two previous questionnaire-based studies(37,38) exposure, emotional concerns, self-
estimated knowledge, and dissonance-reducing heuristics were shown to significantly affect risk 
judgments. For example, people with low exposure to soil contamination rated the risk for other 
inhabitants in Dornach to be higher than people with high exposure levels, whereas people in 
both groups rated the risk for oneself similar. Emotional concerns had a strong influence on the 
way people perceived the risk. The more people were emotionally involved, the higher they 
perceived the risk to be. Self-estimated knowledge, but not actual knowledge, influenced risk 
perception. The more participants claimed they knew about the problem the lower they 
perceived the risk to be. Participants who used dissonance-reducing heuristics were less 
emotionally concerned and did not see the need for decontamination. Dissonance-reducing 
heuristics were often comprised of rather weak arguments, which people used to reduce their 
cognitive dissonance(39) or worry. Such dissonance reduction is probably a type of 
trivialization(40).
The aforementioned variables of exposure, emotional concerns, self-estimated 
knowledge, and the use of dissonance-reducing heuristics, along with the way in which they 
were interrelated, provided some indication of the individual processes at work while people are 
judging a risk. However, what Weber et al.(37) and Grasmück and Scholz(38) could not examine 
in their questionnaire-based studies was the information processing of the participants: it could 
not be ascertained whether participants reasoned using a more intuitive or more analytic process. 
Moreover, there may have been other intervening variables that were unable to be controlled in 
the real-life situation. To determine whether or not the aforementioned variables are central to 
people’s judgments of risk and to investigate these variables in a more controlled environment, 
we developed a computer-based microworld called Dornhausen. Within this microworld 
participants were confronted with different scenarios of soil contamination. In this computer 
simulation we modelled the real case of Dornach and manipulated those variables shown to be 
important in the previous questionnaire-based studies in Dornach.  
In the case of heavy-metal contaminated soil, the personal health risk depends on the 
extent to which one is exposed. As the influence of exposure on risk perception was already of 
special interest due to work in previous studies by Weber et al.(37) and Grasmück and Scholz(38),
it was decided to manipulate exposure an independent variable. Participants were allocated to 
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three groups: 1) an exposure group, which lived in Dornhausen in single-family houses with 
polluted soil, 2) a non exposure group, which lived in similar village nearby (Schoenwil) with 
no soil contamination, 3) an expert-group, taking on the role of external consultants. 
We expected that the method of information processing would also play an important 
role. Thus, we included the variable mode of thought and distinguished between intuitive and 
analytic modes of thought(11). The use of these concepts in this paper is consistent with the work 
by Petty & Caccioppo(41) or the heuristic–systematic model(25,42). We assume that emotions such 
as fear and anxiety inhibit systematic, analytic information processing. In particular, we want to 
clarify and elaborate Trumbo’s(27) findings on the relationship between the information 
processing within the heuristic–systematic model and between information processing and risk 
judgments.  
Finally, we want to investigate the extent to which the basic components of risk 
information, harm and probability, are integrated(43) and whether and under which experimental 
conditions participants focus on only one of the two components. Thus, we systematically 
manipulated harm and probability(44,45). The levels of the independent variable scenario are 
combinations of levels of harm and probability.  
From the arguments and theoretical considerations mentioned above, three research 
questions can be formulated: 
 How do exposure and emotional concern affect the risk judgments and how do these 
variables interact?  
 Which influences do the two modes of thought (i.e., analytical versus intuitive thinking) 
have on the risk judgments?  
 How do participants integrate probability and harm and in which ways do exposure and 
emotional concern affect the way participants integrate probability and harm? 
Finally, as a follow up of the previous quasi-experimental study of Grasmück and 
Scholz(38), we will examine how knowledge components such as information seeking, desire for 
additional information, and dissonance reducing heuristics affect the risk judgments. 
 
5.2. METHOD 
5.2.1. The design of the study and the instrument 
A computer environment has been developed. Participants had to change their place of 
residence at the beginning of the computer simulation. Depending on the test condition, they 
moved either to Dornhausen or to Schoenwil. They also had to make some decisions (e.g., 
whether or not they wanted to cultivate fruits or vegetables in their own garden). After having 
lived for a few years in their new home, participants were informed of the heavy metal soil 
contamination in Dornhausen by the local newspaper. The participants who had been living in 
Dornhausen were informed that they had been exposed for some years. For the non-exposed 
group living in Schoenwil there was no risk for oneself; Dornhausen was simply a village in the 
same political administrative entity. For the expert group, Dornhausen was geographically 
distant.  
In a simulated discussion participants could converse with a colleague about the 
problem. The purpose was to better involve the participants in the situation. Additionally, some 
dissonance-reducing arguments were offered during these discussions. For example, often 
69
mentioned was a man, who lived his whole life in close proximity to the metal processing plant, 
which was the source of the contamination. This man regularly ate vegetables from his own 
garden, was always very healthy, and died at a very old age.  
Participants had the possibility of obtaining information about the Dornach case by 
pressing certain buttons. This information was taken from the real case of Dornach (e.g., the 
type of pollution). They could read a letter from the municipal council, a letter from the plant’s 
board of directors, a statement from experts, a flyer from an environment organisation, or a 
newspaper article. The information was formulated in a neutral manner so as to not affect the 
judgments of participants or lead them in a certain direction. The amount of information gained 
and the time a participant invested in obtaining the information was used to assess the variable 
information seeking. 
The experiment followed the principles of functional measurement design(44).
Participants were informed that there were different possible scenarios of the extent to which 
there could be a risk in Dornhausen. There were three possible levels of probability and three 
possible levels of harm. Thus, participants were required to judge 9 scenarios (see Table I). 
Participants had to decide for each scenario how much money the community should spend on 
decontamination. The more money spent, the better the soil could be cleaned. Thus, the amount 
of money participants chose to spend constituted their judgment of risk in each scenario. The 
maximal amount the community could spend was CHF 10 000 000. Participants of the exposed 
group and of the non-exposed group lived in the same political entity, but in different villages. 
The expert group was the only group to not be directly affected by the decision. In contrast to 
the original specification of the functional measurement approach, we did not work with 
repeated measurements. Due to a lack of time and because the situation should be rather clear to 
the participants, judgments for each combination of probability and harm were only measured 
once. 
 
Table I. 9 Scenarios, for which participants had to make them risk judgments, as a 
function of harm and probability 
 Low probability 
1:1 000 000 
Medium probability 
1:100 000 
High probability 
1:10 000 
Low harm: 
Environmental problems 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Medium harm: 
Environmental problems 
and allergies 
Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
High harm: 
Environmental problems, 
allergies, and kidney 
malfunctions 
Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 
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Three kinds of harm were differentiated. The least dangerous variant involved 
environmental problems resulting from the soil contamination. The medium hazardous variant 
involved an ecological problem and allergies. The most hazardous variant involved an 
ecological problem, allergies, and kidney malfunctions. Next to each harm variant’s verbal 
description was a corresponding illustration. Due to the problems most people have in 
understanding or dealing with numerical representations of the probabilities of risks(46), we 
added some additional information. Apart from the numerical representation, the probabilities 
were described verbally, compared with other sources of risk with a similar probability, and 
graphically demonstrated by manipulating the size of the picture used for each harm variant. 
The idea behind this type of measurement was to investigate the way in which the 
different groups integrate information about probability and harm. Do they integrate this 
information through multiplication? If so, then the main effects of probability and harm and 
their interaction should all be significant in an ANOVA. If they integrate the information 
through addition, then only the main effects of probability and harm should be significant. 
Probably, they neither integrate the information by multiplication nor by addition, but they focus 
on one single information, and then only one main effect gets significant(44).
Upon providing their risk ratings, participants had to answer several questions regarding 
their interaction with the microworld. These questions were integrated in the microworld 
program. Their answers to certain items would provide an indication of whether they processed 
the information and provided the risk ratings rather intuitively (3 items; e.g., "Did you make 
your judgments intuitively?"), or analytically (10 items; e.g., "Did you carefully examine the 
available information?"). The items were constructed on the basis of work by Scholz(11). The use 
of dissonance-reducing heuristics was assessed with 5 items (e.g., In Eastern Europe the 
situation is much worse), with which participants had to rate their level of agreement and the 
extent to which they took it into their consideration. These statements were collected in the real-
life case of Dornach(37,38). The desire for further information about soil contamination was 
assessed using a single holistic judgment. All items were assessed using a bipolar continuous 
scale, with values between 0 and 1. In order to move to the next screen, all items had to be 
answered. 
To assess the change in emotional concern caused by the risk situation, we compared 
ratings participants made before the microworld study with ratings they made after their risk 
judgments in the microworld. Participants had to fill out a questionnaire before the microworld 
study(47), where they had to give their judgments to different risk sources and different risk 
characteristics, similar to those of the psychometric paradigm(3). One of the items asked the 
personal emotional concern regarding the risk of heavy-metal soil contamination. This item 
were included in the microworld program. In addition, we included a scale of emotional 
demarcation in the questionnaire(48), which is expected to be a personal trait. This scale is 
comprised of 7 items (e.g., The problems of other people are affecting my mood). 
 
5.2.2. Participants 
60 Swiss high-school students (Kantonsschule) participated in our study. The average 
age of the participants was M = 17.8 years (min = 16, max = 21). The groups were similar in 
terms of sex-distribution (by design) and in terms of age (both between and within groups for 
the two sexes; see Table II). Participants were randomly assigned to the groups, the only 
restriction being that each group consist of 12 female and 8 male students. 19 (24%) participants 
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were smokers. There were no significant statistical differences between the three groups for any 
of these data. 
 
Table II. Description of the samples 
Experimental 
group 
Exposed lay persons  Non-exposed lay persons Experts 
Sample N = 20
(8 male, 12 female) 
N = 20
(8 male, 12 female) 
N = 20
(8 male, 12 female) 
Age (in years) M = 17.7 
(male = 17.8, female = 17.6)
M = 18.0 
(male = 18.0, female = 18.0)
M = 17.8 
(male = 17.4, female = 18.1)
SD = 0.93 SD = 1.05 SD = 1.07 
5.2.3. Procedure 
Participants filled in a questionnaire approximately two weeks prior to the experiment. 
For each different risk source, they were to rate their level of emotional concern. The emotional 
concern values for soil contamination were taken as the base or reference value.  
The investigation was run in computer rooms with each student having their own 
computer. Participants had sufficient time to complete all tasks, with the experiment taking 
between 30 and 65 minutes to complete. Participants were unaware of the procedure or the 
nature of experimental design and any manipulations during the data collection. 
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5.3. RESULTS 
In order to examine the extent to which the independent variable exposure (low vs. 
medium vs. high) had an effect on emotional concern, we compared levels of emotional concern 
measured using a questionnaire prior to the experiment with levels of emotional concern 
reported after having interacted with the microworld (time of measurement: before vs. after 
microworld interaction). Both emotional concern scores were z-transformed. Gender was also 
included in the repeated measurements ANOVA as an independent variable. 
 
Table III: ANOVA table with emotional concern as dependent variable and exposure, 
gender and time of measurement as independent variables (Nexposed = 20, Nnon-exposed = 20, NExpert 
= 20)
Source Df F Sig. 
Exposure 2 0.44 0.645 
Gender 1 0.04 0.852 
Change in Emotional 
Concern 
(before vs. within the 
experiment) 
1 0.18 0.673 
Exposure * Gender 2 0.12 0.887 
Exposure * Change in 
Emotional Concern 
2 2.4 0.098 
Gender * Change in 
Emotional Concern 
1 4.5 0.039 
Exposure * Gender * 
Change in Emotional 
Concern 
2 3.2 0.049 
Exposure and gender had no direct influence on emotional concern. Despite the absence 
of any main effects, there was an interaction between gender and time of measurement (N = 60,
df = 1, F = 4.5, p < 0.05) and a three-way interaction between exposure, gender and time of 
measurement (N = 60, df = 2, F = 3.2, p < 0.05). Although gender did not have a direct effect on 
emotional concern (Mmale = 0.54, Mfemale = 0.62), male but not female participants differed in 
their change in emotional concern in dependency of the fact if they are exposed or not as we can 
see in Figure 1. Non-exposed male showed even a decrease of emotional concern. Female 
participants were in the same way emotional concerned however they are exposed or not. In the 
role of an expert male and female participants did not show notable changes in the degree of 
emotional concern. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between exposure and emotional concern as a function of gender. 
The Figure shows means for differences in emotional concern in comparison to a pre-test rating. 
 
Examination of the risk judgments using exposure, probability, and harm, as independent 
variables (see Table IV) reveals that there is no significant main effect of exposure. The fact that 
significant main effects were obtained for probability (N = 60, df = 2, F = 17.8, p < 0.001) and 
for harm (N = 60, df = 2, F = 36.4, p < 0.001), with no significant interaction effect between 
these two independent variable (N = 60, df = 4, F = 0.16, p = 0.96), indicates that integrated the 
information by addition and not by multiplication (see Figure 2). Whereas participants in the 
exposed group differentiated more between the various levels of harm, experts took the level of 
probability more into their account when making their risk judgments. However, these 
tendencies were not significant. 
 
Table IV: ANOVA table for the risk judgments as a function of harm, probability and 
exposure (Nexposed = 20, Nnon-exposed = 20, NExpert = 20)
Source Df F Sig. 
Harm 2 36.4 < 0.001 
Probability 2 17.8 < 0.001 
Exposure 2 0.54 0.582 
Harm * Probability 4 0.16 0.960 
Harm * Exposure 4 1.6 0.186 
Probability * Exposure 4 0.24 0.917 
Harm * Probability * Exposure 8 0.11 0.999 
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Figure 2. Risk judgments for the three different exposure groups 
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To investigate the influence of emotional concern on the risk judgments we conducted an 
ANOVA with harm (low vs. medium vs. high), probability (low vs. medium vs. high), and 
emotional concern as independent variables (see Table V). As emotional concern was measured 
on a bipolar continuous scale from 0 to 1, participants were first split into three groups of equal 
size varying in terms of their level of emotional concern: low (0 – 0.5), medium (0.51 – 0.69), 
and high (0.7 – 1). Finally, we also compared the rating for emotional concern participants gave 
in the first questionnaire (i.e., before interacting with microworld) with the rating they gave 
within the microworld (i.e., after interacting with the microworld).. 
Emotional concern had a direct and highly significant effect on the risk judgments as 
measured by the amount of money spent on decontamination (N = 60, df = 2, F = 6.6, p < 0.01). 
The group comprised of participants with high levels of emotional concern were more willing to 
pay for decontamination than the other two groups did. There was also an interaction between 
emotional concern and harm (N = 60, df = 4, F = 2.5, p < 0.05). The risk judgments of 
participants with high levels of emotional concern were influenced by levels of harm to a larger 
extent than was the case for the remaining two emotional concern groups. The main effects of 
harm and probability were also significant in this analysis and can be interpreted in the same 
way as mentioned above. 
 
Table V: ANOVA table for the risk judgments as a function of harm, probability and 
emotional concern (NlowEC = 20, NmediumEC = 20, NhighEC = 20)
Source Df F Sig. 
Harm 2 37.5 < 0.001 
Probability 2 18.4 < 0.001 
Emotional Concern 2 6.6 0.001 
Harm * Probability 4 0.16 0.957 
Harm * Emotional 
Concern 
4 2.5 0.043 
Probability * Emotional 
Concern 
4 0.37 0.834 
Harm * Probability * 
Emotional Concern 
8 0.04 1.000 
The homogeneity of the two sets of items measuring the two distinct modes of thought 
was tested using a reliability analysis. Cronbach’s alpha for the items indexing the intuitive 
mode of thought was 0.71; for the items indexing the analytic mode of thought Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.78. After building a score participants were split into three equal sized groups each. 
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Table VI: Means and ANOVA with risk judgments as dependent variable and extent of 
adoption of the intuitive mode of thought as independent variable  
 Intuitive mode of thought ANOVA 
Variable low medium high F p
Risk 
judgments 
in CHF 
3,562,000 4,843,000 5,476,000 14.79 < 0.001 
Table VII: Means and ANOVA with risk judgments as dependent variable and extent of 
adoption of the analytic mode of thought as independent variable 
 Analytic mode of thought ANOVA 
Variable low medium high F p
Risk 
judgments 
in CHF 
3,703,000 5,615,000 4,563,000 14.23 < 0.001 
The extent to which an intuitive mode of thought was adopted directly influenced risk 
judgments (N = 60, df = 2, F = 14.8, p < 0.001; see Table VI). This influence was linear (Mlow = 
3,562,000, Mmedium = 4,843,000, Mhigh = 5,476,000) such that the more participants adopted an 
intuitive mode of thought the more they adopted risk-reducing behaviour. Since we have already 
examined the effects of harm and probability and since there were no interaction effects between 
either mode of thought and harm or probability, we only report the effect of the variable mode 
of thought in Table VI and VII. The extent to which the analytic mode of thought was adopted 
also had a main effect (N = 60, df = 2, F = 14.2, p < 0.001; see Table VII). Examining the mean 
for each group reveals that an inverted U-shaped function is the best fit for the data (Mlow = 
3'703'000, Mmedium = 5'615'000, Mhigh = 4'563'000). Participants who moderately adopted an 
analytical mode of thought exhibited the most risk-reducing behaviour. Consistent with this, 
curve estimation using a regression analysis indicated that a quadratic function was more 
appropriate (F = 3.9, p = 0.02). 
 
Table VIII: Correlations between the two modes of thought and other variables (N =
60).  
 Mode of thought 
Variable Intuitive Analytic 
Wish for further 
information 
0.30* 0.15 
Information-seeking 0.13 0.38** 
Emotional concern 0.48** 0.22 
Dissonance-reducing 
heuristics 
-0.09 -0.02 
Note: Correlation with ** is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Correlation with * is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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The two modes of thought were slightly correlated, r = 0.28, p < 0.05. As seen in Table 
VIII, whereas the intuitive mode of thought was correlated with the expressed wish for further 
information (r = 0.30, p < 0.05) but not with the time the spent on information-seeking (r = 0.15,
ns), the analytic mode of thought was correlated with the time the spent on information-seeking 
(r = 0.38, p < 0.01) but not with the expressed wish for further information (r = 0.13, ns). The 
intuitive mode of thought was correlated with emotional concern (r = 0.48, p < 0.01). The 
variable dissonance-reducing heuristics were split into three equal sized groups: low (0 – 0.27), 
medium (0.28 – 0.52), and high (0.53 – 1). The use of dissonance-reducing was not related with 
either mode of thought, but was related to emotional concern. The more people were 
emotionally concerned the more they used dissonance-reducing heuristics (see Table IX). 
Emotional concern correlated negatively with emotional demarcation (r = -0.37, p < 0.01). 
 
Tab. IX: Means and ANOVA with dissonance-reducing heuristics as independent 
variable and emotional concern as dependent variable 
 Dissonance-reducing heuristics ANOVA 
Variable low medium high F p
Emotional 
concern 
0.2899 0.5019 0.4333 4.280 0.019 
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5.4. DISCUSSION 
So as to improve the understanding of individual processes involved when dealing with 
risks, we confronted participants with the risk of heavy metal contaminated soil. Participants 
judged various alternatives, which were systematically varied with regard to probability and 
harm. The reported study also examined variables such as exposure, emotional concern, and the 
use of dissonance reducing heuristics, which previous research had demonstrated to be 
important in people’s risk perception in a real-life case study of a site contaminated with heavy 
metals(38). We used a computer simulation to test these variables in an experimental and 
controlled environment. Exposure was the key variable in our experimental design. 
Exposure did not directly influence on the risk judgments. We assume that the influence 
of exposure on risk judgments is mediated by emotional concern, whereby the effect is carried 
by variables such as gender and the use of dissonance reducing heuristics. While exposed male 
participants are more emotionally concerned then non-exposed, female participants are 
emotionally involved weather they are exposed on them own or someone else. 
In Marks and Winterfeldt’s(49) study, exposure was positively correlated with perceived 
risk. Why, then, did exposure not have a significant effect on risk judgments in our 
investigation? In Marks & Winterfeldt’s study participants were not living with the risk as it was 
the case in Dornach or in our computer simulation. Rather, they had to judge the risk given a 
certain probability of being exposed in the future. Thus, to prevent the possibility of exposure, 
people judged the risk as being higher; an expression of the “not in my backyard” phenomenon. 
The situation in Dornach or in the Dornhausen microworld is different: people are already living 
on contaminated soil and have been aware of the problem for some time. People probably try to 
reduce their feelings of worry or fear by using dissonance-reducing heuristics. Of course, some 
people do not share these feelings or worry or fear and are less irritated about the situation. The 
individual level of emotional involvement, is likely to affect the of use dissonance-reducing 
heuristics.  
The interaction effect of gender, exposure, and emotional concern probably can also help 
to explain why in some studies there is a gender difference in risk perception(50) and in some 
studies not(51). In situations where people are exposed male and female judge the risk the same 
way. When people have to judge a risk they are not in charge with, then women perceive the 
risk higher then men do. 
In contrast to exposure, emotional concern had a strong direct influence on the risk 
judgment. The more people were emotionally concerned the higher they rated the risk. People 
higher in emotional concern also paid more attention to the nature of the consequences and 
focused their risk-reducing efforts on the alternative with the highest level of harm. 
Emotional concern is also related to other variables. People with high levels of emotional 
concern used more dissonance-reducing heuristics. These rather weak arguments were 
obviously more necessary when people were more emotionally involved. This positive 
correlation stands in contrast to the results of Grasmück and Scholz(38), who found a negative 
correlation. This difference in findings can be explained by explicitly considering the timeline of 
the risk and adopting a dynamic approach. In our study, participants were confronted for the 
first time with the problem while participants in Grasmück and Scholz’s study had been familiar 
with the problem for years. As people had been aware of the contamination for many years, their 
emotional concern had presumably already been reduced by the use of such heuristics(52). In a 
situation where people are confronted with a new risk, people with higher emotional concerns 
are more likely to use dissonance-reducing heuristics. In a situation where people have already 
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been living with a risk for a long time, like in the case of Dornach, the cognitive structure of the 
heuristics gets consolidated, which lowers emotional concerns permanently and determines risk 
judgments. In conclusion, these simple heuristics or arguments seem to be a strategy by which 
to reduce emotional concern. People who can not deal with their negative emotions, probably 
feeling afraid or insecure, are more disposed to use dissonance-reducing heuristics. 
Examining the integration of information about probability and harm it can clearly be 
seen that people were additively and not multiplicatively, integrating this information. In an 
ANOVA, while both had main effects on risk judgments, no interaction between these two 
information sources was observed(44). Examination of the distributions of money allocations 
(i.e., risk judgments) rules out the possibility a ceiling effect. Additively integrating information 
concerning probability and harm, as opposed to multiplicatively doing so, stands in contrast to 
normative solutions and to the empirical findings of Anderson and Shanteau(53) in the context of 
SEU-Theory. The naturalistic, complex environment of the microworld may have encouraged 
this kind of integration among participants. It is probably the case that the negative cognitive 
framing lead to people using the simpler, additive integration. Additionally, as mentioned 
above, the greater the emotional concern of people the more they focused on the component of 
harm. 
Emotional concern is positively correlated with the extent to which one adopts an 
intuitive mode of thought. As for emotional concern, an intuitive mode of thought increases the 
perceived risk. On the other hand, adopting an analytic mode of thought has an inverted U-
shaped function with risk judgments. Participants with moderate levels of adoption of the 
analytic mode of thought were more likely to show risk-reducing behaviour. A potential 
explanation is as follows. In general, the analytic and the intuitive modes of thought do not 
exclude each other. They are two independent but partly correlated dimensions. If someone pays 
little attention to the risk situation, then that person judges the risk using low levels of intuitive 
and analytic thought; this person simply does not want to think about the risk situation. Thus, 
risk ratings or the risk-reducing behaviour for low levels of adoption of the intuitive and analytic 
modes of thought are low. The more the person is involved in the case, the more that person 
adopts an analytical and intuitive mode of thought. Yet this co-variance works only up to a 
medium level. Due to limited cognitive capacity, a person cannot adopt both modes of thought 
to a high extent. If a person is highly emotionally involved, then that person is also likely to 
have adopted an intuitive mode of thought to a great extent and cannot do likewise for the 
analytic mode of thought. People with a high level of intuitive thought judge the risk to be 
higher, whereas people with a high level of analytic thought are ‘rational’ and judge the risk to 
be moderate. 
Putting all the pieces together we can formulate the model shown in Figure 3. Exposure 
does not have a direct influence on risk judgments. Exposure may increase emotional concern in 
conjunction with the level of the emotional demarcation of the person; females, for example, are 
in general more empathic(48,54,55) and are therefore more likely to be emotionally involved even 
when they are not exposed. Each individual has a certain level or threshold value of emotional 
involvement or worry that they can support or accept. If the emotional involvement exceeds that 
threshold then the person is likely to use dissonance-reducing heuristics. These heuristics, over 
time, gradually decrease a person’s emotional involvement. This gradual, delayed decrease, is 
the reason why an initial positive correlation between emotional concern and dissonance-
reducing heuristics becomes a negative one after a certain period time as was the case in 
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Dornach. At the beginning, emotions dominate the process of making risk judgments; with time 
the cognitive structure of the heuristics becomes stronger and determines the risk judgments. 
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Individual
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system
Cognitive
system
Figure 3. Model of the postulated relationship 
 
Emotional involvement or concern has a direct influence on risk judgments and an 
indirect influence through the different modes of thought. A high degree of emotional 
involvement increases the perceived risk and leads to a greater focus on the component of harm. 
Adoption of the intuitive mode of thought has a linear positive correlation with risk judgments 
and risk-reducing behaviour. The analytic mode of thought has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship, with people being most motivated to do something against the risk at moderate 
levels of analytic thought. While we could not establish a significant relationship between 
emotional involvement and adoption of the analytic mode of thought in our study, we suppose 
that the relationship is also an inverted U-shape. According to the Yerkes-Dodson rule(56),
people are more likely adopt an analytic mode of thought when they have a moderate level of 
emotional involvement. Our study involved a low-risk with possible effects only expected on a 
long-term basis. This was probably the reason why participants were not very highly 
emotionally involved and, thus, the highest values in emotional concern were only in a medium 
range. 
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Comparing our results with the results of previous studies in Dornach(37,38) reveals that 
the main findings, such as the influence of emotional concern on risk perception, could be 
replicated. Even contradictory results provided a hint of how the dynamic of these individual 
processes might work. This combination of quasi-experimental questionnaire-based studies in a 
real-life situation with the modelling of the risk situation and the use of an experimental design 
in a computer-based environment is, of course, a rather time-consuming but, in our point of 
view, promising methodological approach. However, this follow-up study should be understood 
as an exploratory pilot study; the sample was relatively small, the results should be better 
replicated, and our scales could also be improved.  
We have provided a very interesting view of the individual processes underlying risk 
judgments. Emotional concerns have a strong influence on risk judgments. Possible effects of 
exposure on risk judgments may be moderated by emotional concern and by the interaction 
between gender and emotional concern or emotional demarcation and concern. The use of 
dissonance-reducing heuristics is a way to reduce the level of emotional concern. Whereas the 
extent of adoption of an intuitive mode of thought has a linear relation with risk-reducing 
behaviour, the extent of adoption of an analytic mode of thought has an inverted U-shaped 
relation. The generalisability of our results to other types of risk situation has to be tested. The 
emotional impacts on risk judgments could vary depending on the type of emotion(16) and on the 
interaction with the cognitive system(15). Future research should continue to follow and adopt a 
dynamic and integrated approach so as to gain a better understanding of individual risk 
perception and risk judgments. 
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6. Conclusions and Outlook 
The starting point of the project was the real-life case of Dornach. We wanted to know 
how people are perceiving the risk of heavy metal contaminated soil. Thereby, exposure was 
from special interest, because the related health risk depends on the extent of ones exposure. 
Personal exposure was a relevant characteristic in the studies of Sclovic et al. (1980, 85), which 
should increase the perceived risk. Also Marks & Von Winterfeldt (1984) postulated a positive 
correlation between exposure and perceived risk, which they labelled the 'not in my backyard'-
effect. In our studies exposure had not a direct influence on the risk judgements. I think that 
exposure has only an effect on risk judgements, if they are mediated by the emotional concern. 
In general, exposure increases the emotional concern. Emotional concern on its side has a very 
strong influence on the risk perception. The higher the emotional concern is, i.e. the more one is 
worried or afraid, the higher is the perceived risk. But there are two intervening factors which 
can cover up the influence of exposure on emotional concern. Firstly, people with a strong 
emotional demarcation are 'immune' to exposure effects. Particularly, females have in general a 
lower emotional demarcation (Figner & Grasmück, 1999), i.e. they are more empathetic 
(Bichof-Köhler, 1989). Thus, females are emotionally involved even if they are not directly 
exposed. This exposure - gender interaction can probably help to explain why some studies 
(Flynn, Slovic & Mertz, 1994) find a gender difference in the risk perception, whereas other 
studies do not . (Fontaine & Smith, 1995) or just under certain circumstances (Greenberg & 
Schneider, 1995). Secondly, I suppose for emotional concern. If the emotional concern, worry or 
fear, is permanently above this individual acceptance level, the individual will start to use 
dissonance-reducing heuristics, to get rid of these unpleasant feelings. I think there might be 
significant individual differences in this level. Some people can deal better with dissonance and 
unpleasant emotions, other people can not support them and are more likely to use dissonance-
reducing heuristics. This process might explain why in the case of Dornach, where people have 
been exposed to the risk for many years, we do not find the clear effects Marks & Von 
Winterfeldt (1984) found. Participants in their study had to judge a hypothetical future risk. 
A very interesting finding is also the change of the correlation for some couples of 
variables, i.e. the direction of the correlation. In study 3 the correlation between emotional 
concern and dissonance-reducing heuristics was negative, whereas in study 4 this correlation 
was positive. A change like this is typical for complex dynamic systems and can be explained 
by the feedback loop via individual acceptance level for emotional input and the use of 
dissonance-reducing heuristics. In addition, the negative correlation we found between self-
estimated knowledge and the perceived risk in study 3 is in contradiction to some studies, which 
found a positive correlation (Maderthaner et al., 1978). This change of correlation indicates a 
dynamic process as well. If a risk is new, a higher self-estimated knowledge stands for a higher 
risk awareness, which increases the risk perception. If a risk is old and known, a higher self-
estimated knowledge can give a feeling of control, which decreases the perceived risk. 
According to the results of study 4 participants are integrating probability and harm 
rather by addition than by multiplication, a ceiling effect can be excluded. This is in 
contradiction to the normative solution (see also Anderson & Shanteau, 1970). Already at 
around 13 years most children do proportionally integrate probability and harm (Falk & 
Wilkening, 1998). But the fact that most of the participants in our study integrated additively 
could be explained by the naturalistic setting. People do integrate the information in a complex 
situation as it is the case in Dornach with simple rules. Nevertheless, exposed people show a 
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tendency to differentiate the harm components. They look at what the differences are of the 
probable damage potentials and pay more attention to a risk with higher damage potential and 
less attention to a risk with a lower damage potential. However, this tendency is not significant. 
On the other hand, a clear result was that participants with higher values for emotional concern 
rated the risk higher in general, and focussed more on the harm components. 
In contrast to the original functional measurement design we did not work with repeated 
measurements, the lack of time was the main reason for this. Some participants needed more 
than 1 hour to complete the experiment. The pre-tests showed that the participants understood 
both the design and the scenarios well and did not have any major problems reaching their 
judgements. The setting was rather naturalistic. Participants also had to give their judgements 
for a second risk situation, the exposure to a cellular phone base station. But because the article 
was already very complex, we did not assess all the other variables with the cellular phone 
scenarios. In general, the results were similar. The advantage of a repeated measurement is the 
fact that you have reliable risk variables for each individual. To have also measured at the 
individual level, I developed some algorithms. These measures were not described in the article, 
but showed similar results than at the group level. Advantages of these algorithms are that you 
have continuos and not nominal scales. Thus, you know the degree to which, and how far 
someone integrate the information by addition or multiplication, or is focussing on one 
component, and you can correlate it with other variables. Moreover, the visual check for results 
indicate a possible multiplication is not necessary. 
It has also to be considered that risk perception and risk acceptance (verbal and 
behavioural) are determined by different variables. Risk perception is predicted exclusively or 
mainly by emotional concern. Risk acceptance is in addition predicted by additional variables 
such as benefit. 
Future research should focus on psychological processes on an individual level, 
particularly to dynamic processes. Emotions are playing an important role, it could be further 
investigated what emotions play what role in the risk perception process. The emotions, which 
are involved in risk perception, probably could be set in relation to the individual motivational 
profile of a person. The missing link between actual knowledge and risk perception, at least in 
the case of Dornach, and the exclusive role of emotional concern to increase the desire for 
further information, should be considered in the risk communication context. In fact, results of 
the risk perception research should be more considered in the risk communication context in 
general. 
From the methodological point of view, the combination of quasi-experimental design in 
a real-life naturalistic setting followed by an experimental design, which investigates the 
variables in a computer simulation, seem to be a good and beneficial approach. The real-life 
context guarantees a higher relevance and external validity of the results. The Microworld 
allowed an objective data collection and the relevant variables could be systematically varied. 
Of course, it was explorative and the only major disadvantage was the vast amount of work such 
an approach demands (e.g., travelling to Dornach, programming a Microworld). 
In my view, this project has some relevant implications for the theory of risk perception 
and the used methodology as well. But this project not only had an impact on the scientific 
study, but it also had some relevance for Dornach itself. First, we wrote the questionnaire for the 
first study in co-operation with the members of the town council in Dornach. Second, we 
offered a case study book about Dornach to the general public. Third, we sent the results of the 
studies to the participants and we also presented them to the town council. We gained a good 
88
understanding of the situation in Dornach. The heavy-metal soil contamination was compared to 
other risk sources and described by some characteristics/ factors. Thus, we have an idea how 
this risk source is perceived. 
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8. Abstract 
The goal of the project was to investigate the psychological processes of risk perception 
on an individual level. Thereby, the case of Dornach gave the applied context. Dornach is a 
village near Basel, where the soil is widely contaminated with heavy-metals. Because the 
personal health risk of soil contamination depends highly on the extent one is exposed, exposure 
was a crucial variable in our experimental designs. Four studies were derived in a timely 
sequence and the later studies were based on the results of the previous ones. In so far, the 
project had an explorative character. 
In the first quasi-experimental and questionnaire based study (N= 80), the risk perception 
of exposed inhabitants of Dornach was compared with the risk perception of people from 
comparable villages, but where there is no soil contamination. Whereas exposed persons judged 
the risk at their residence higher than non-exposed people did, exposed persons judged the risk 
of heavy metal soil contamination in general lower than non-exposed persons. Heavy metal soil 
contamination was compared to other risk sources and according to a factor analysis it was 
perceived indifferently regarding dread, its uncontrollability was estimated as medium, and its 
catastrophic potential as low. Sustainability, like the prevention of harm for future generations, 
were highly correlated with the acceptance of the use of bioremediation methods on the people's 
residential area. During this first study, we had intensive contact with some inhabitants of 
Dornach and we could identify some relevant additional variables such as the use of dissonance-
reducing heuristics or emotional involvement, which we wanted to include in the following 
studies. 
In the second questionnaire study (N=112), similar to those of the psychometric 
paradigm, we compared the results of a classical factor analysis, which is aggregated over 
participants, with an individual factor analysis, which is aggregated over risk sources. Heavy 
metal soil contamination was compared with other ultra-low-risks such as using cellular phones, 
consumption of beef (BSE), and genetically modified food, and with other classical risks like 
traffic, smoking, and nuclear power. Factor analysis on the individual level shows that the factor 
dread, which we found in the classical factor analysis, was split in the two factors of emotional 
concern (Factor 1) and damage potential (Factor 2). Benefit was a third factor. Regression 
analysis shows that the factor emotional concern is an essential predictor for the perceived risk, 
the risk acceptance, and the desire for additional information. Whereas emotional concern and 
the potential damage are significant predictors of the perceived risk, emotional concern and 
benefit are the predictors for risk acceptance.  
The third quasi-experimental, questionnaire-based study was again conducted in the 
community of Dornach (N=57). Because the level of contamination varies with the distance 
from the source of the contamination, we compared the perception of risk of heavy metal 
contaminated soil by high-exposed and low-exposed inhabitants. Both groups judged the risk for 
themselves similarly whereas the low-exposure group, when compared to the high-exposure 
group, perceived the risk for other affected people living in their community to be higher. 
Besides this exposure effect, risk perception is mainly determined by emotional concerns. The 
extent of actual knowledge about the risk had no influence, unlike self-estimated knowledge. 
Judgments on the need for decontamination are determined by risk perception, less application 
of dissonance-reducing heuristics, and commitment to sustainability. The desire for additional 
information is not affected by missing knowledge but is affected by emotional concerns.  
100
In the forth study we analyzed the impact of the variables, which were identified as 
relevant in the previous studies, by an experimental computer-based design (N=60). In this 
"Microworld" we modeled the case of Dornach and participants had to provide risk judgments 
for different scenarios either in the role of an exposed layperson, a non-exposed layperson or an 
expert. Probability and harm were varied. Thereby, the participants integrated the information 
on harm and probability by addition and not by multiplication. Exposure had no direct influence 
on the risk judgments. Emotional concern had a significant direct influence on the risk 
judgments and showed interactions with harm. Emotional concerned subjects had also a more 
pronounced desire for additional information, used less dissonance reducing heuristics and were 
more likely to be processing in the intuitive mode of thinking. Thereby, the intuitive mode of 
thinking and the analytic mode of thinking differed in their influence on the risk judgements.  
Finally, based on the results of the four studies a model of individual risk perception and 
judgements was developed. Thereby, emotional concern played a crucial role. On the one hand, 
it increases the perceived risk. On the other hand, if the emotional involvement, worry or fear, is 
over an individual accepted level, the individual is likely to use dissonance-reducing heuristics, 
which will reduce the emotional concern particularly in the long term. These dissonance-
reducing heuristics can cover up this way the influence of exposure on emotional concern. 
Exposure does not have a direct influence on risk perception. Another intervening variable 
between exposure and emotional concern is the emotional demarcation. Because females do 
have a lower emotional demarcation than men have, i.e. females are more empathic, they show 
higher levels of emotional concern even when they are not exposed on their own. 
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9. Zusammenfassung 
Die Zielsetzung dieses Projektes war es, die psychologischen Prozesse, die der 
Risikowahrnehmung zugrunde liegen, auf einer individuellen Ebene zu analysieren. Dabei gab 
der Fall Dornach den angewandten Kontext. Dornach ist eine Gemeinde in der Nähe von Basel, 
in der grosse Teile des Bodens mit Schwermetallen kontaminiert sind. Da das persönliche 
Gesundheitsrisiko, welches von mit Schwermetallen belasteten Böden ausgeht, in hohem Masse 
von der Exposition abhängt, war die objektive Betroffenheit eine zentrale Variable in den 
Forschungsdesigns.  Es wurden vier zeitlich aufeinander folgende Studien durchgeführt, so dass 
jeweils die Resultate der vorgängigen Studie in der Nachfolgenden Theorie generierend 
miteinbezogen werden konnten. Das Projekt hatte in sofern einen explorativen Charakter. 
In der ersten quasi-experimentellen und Fragebogen basierten Studie (N= 80) wurde die 
Risikowahrnehmung von betroffenen Einwohnern von Dornach der Risikowahrnehmung von 
Personen aus vergleichbaren Orten gegenübergestellt, in denen es keine Bodenbelastung gab. 
Während erwartungsgemäss die betroffenen Personen das Risiko am Wohnort höher 
einschätzten als nicht selbst betroffene Personen, wurde das Risiko generell von betroffenen 
Leuten tiefer eingeschätzt. Das wahrgenommene Risiko von schwermetallbelasteten Böden 
wurde mit der Risikowahrnehmung anderer Risikoquellen verglichen und entsprechend einer 
Faktorenanalyse wird das Risiko von schwermetallbelasteten Böden im Vergleich indifferent 
hinsichtlich unmittelbaren Schrecken ('dread'), mittel hinsichtlich Unkontrollierbarkeit und 
gering hinsichtlich Katastrohpenpotential eingeschätzt. Nachhaltigkeitsgedanken wie z.B. der 
Schutz zukünftiger Generationen zeigten einen deutlichen Zusammenhang mit der Akzeptanz 
von Bioremediationsverfahren ('sanfte Sanierung'). Durch den intensiven Kontakt mit den 
Einwohnern von Dornach im Laufe dieser ersten Studie konnten wir einige weitere wichtige 
Einflussfaktoren auf die Risikowahrnehmung eruieren, wie z.B. der Gebrauch von Dissonanz 
reduzierenden Heuristiken oder die emotionale Betroffenheit als Gegenstück zur objektiven 
Betroffenheit. Diese zusätzlichen Variablen wurden in den folgenden Studien integriert. 
In der zweiten Studie (N= 112) , ähnlich denen des Psychometrischen Paradigmas in der 
Risikoforschung, verglichen wir die Resultate aus einer 'klassischen' Faktorenanalyse, bei der 
über die Probanden aggregiert wird, mit einer 'individuellen' Faktorenanalyse, bei der über die 
Risikoquellen aggregiert wird. Das Risiko von schwermetallbelasteten Böden wurde einerseits 
mit anderen 'ultra-low-risks' wie dem Gebrauch von Mobiltelefonen, der Konsumation von 
Rindfleisch (BSE) und dem Verzehr von gentechnisch veränderten Lebensmitteln, sowie mit 
klassischen Risiken wie Rauchen, Strassenverkehr und Atomenergie verglichen. In der 
Faktorenanalyse auf der individuellen Ebene wurde der erste Faktor der klassischen 
Faktorenanalyse 'dread' in die zwei Komponenten emotionale Betroffenheit (1. Faktor) und 
Schadenspotential (2. Faktor)  aufgeteilt. Nutzen war ein dritter Faktor. Regressionsanalysen 
zeigten, dass der Faktor der emotionalen Betroffenheit ein wichtiger Prädiktor für 
wahrgenommenes Risiko, Risikoakzeptanz und dem Wunsch nach mehr Information 
konstituiert. Während emotionale Betroffenheit und wahrgenommenes Schadenspotential 
signifikante Einflussgrössen für die Risikowahrnehmung darstellen, sind die besten 
Vorhersageparameter für die Risikoakzeptanz die emotionale Betroffenheit und der 
wahrgenommene Nutzen. 
Die dritte quasi-experimentelle und Fragebogen basierten Studie (N= 57) wurde wieder 
in Dornach durchgeführt. Da die Höhe der Schwermetallbelastung in Dornach örtlich mit der 
Distanz zur ehemaligen Risikoquelle stark variiert, verglichen wir Personen aus am stärksten 
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belasteten mit Personen aus nur geringfügig belasteten Gebieten. Beide Gruppen schätzten das 
persönliche Risiko gleich ein. Die Gruppe der Nicht-Betroffenen schätzte aber das Risiko für 
andere Personen in Dornach deutlich höher ein. Neben diesen Effekt der objektiven 
Betroffenheit ist die Risikowahrnehmung an erster Stelle durch emotionale Betroffenheit 
determiniert. Das Ausmass des tatsächlichen Wissens über das Risiko hatte keinen Einfluss, die 
Selbsteinschätzung hinsichtlich des eigenen Wissenstandes hingegen schon. Das Bedürfnis nach 
einer Sanierung ist getrieben durch die Risikowahrnehmung, einer geringeren Anwendung von 
Dissonanz reduzierenden Heuristiken und einer Selbstverpflichtung zu 
Nachhaltigkeitsüberlegungen. Der Wunsch nach zusätzlicher Information zeigt keinen 
Zusammenhang zu tatsächlichem (fehlenden) Wissen sondern zur emotionalen Betroffenheit. 
In der vierten Studie analysierten wir den Einfluss der von uns identifizierten Variablen 
mit einem experimentellen Computer basierten Untersuchungsdesign (N= 60). In dieser 
'Mikrowelt' wurde der Fall Dornach modelliert. Den Versuchspersonen wurde entweder die 
Rolle als Nicht-Betroffener, als Betroffener oder als Experte zugeschrieben. Diese hatten 
verschieden Szenarios zu beurteilen, bei denen Schadensausmass und 
Eintretenswahrscheinlichkeit systematisch variiert wurden. Dabei integrierten die 
Versuchspersonen die Information zu Schadensausmass und Eintretenswahrscheinlichkeit nicht 
multiplikativ sondern additiv. Die objektive Betroffenheit hatte keinen direkten Einfluss auf die 
Risikoeinschätzungen, aber indirekt über die emotionale Betroffenheit. Emotional betroffene 
Personen hatten einen ausgeprägten  Wunsch nach zusätzlicher Information, benutzten weniger 
Dissonanz reduzierende Heuristiken und waren eher im intuitiven Denkmodus. Der intuitive und 
der analytische Denkmodi hatten dabei unterschiedliche Effekte auf die Risikourteile. 
Schliesslich wurde aufgrund der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse ein Modell zur individuellen 
Risikowahrnehmung entwickelt. Emotionale Betroffenheit spielt eine zentrale Rolle. Einerseits 
erhöht es das wahrgenommene Risiko direkt. Andererseits, wenn die emotionale Betroffenheit, 
wie Furcht oder Besorgnis, über einen individuellen akzeptierten Schwellwert zu liegen kommt,  
werden vermehrt Dissonanz reduzierende Heuristiken verwendet, welche die emotionale 
Betroffenheit wieder reduzieren. Diese Heuristiken können so insbesondere über einem 
langfristigen Zeitraum den Effekt der objektiven Betroffenheit auf die emotionale Betroffenheit 
überlagern. Emotionale Abgrenzung ist eine weitere Variable, welche den Einfluss der 
objektiven auf die emotionale Betroffenheit moderiert. Da Frauen sich generell weniger 
emotional abgrenzen als Männer, empathischer sind, zeigen diese eine emotionale Betroffenheit 
auch wenn sie selbst nicht objektiv betroffen sind. 
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11. Appendix: 
 
Integrale Bewertung von Sanierungsalternativen: Potentiale, 
Komponenten und Grenzen eines transdisziplinären Prozesses 
 
OLAF TIETJE, ROLAND W. SCHOLZ, STEFAN HESSKE, OLAF WEBER, DIRK GRASMÜCK UND 
JAQUELINE FRICK (2002) 
 
TERRA TECH, 2, 44-48 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Eine integrale Bewertung von Sanierungsalternativen umfasst ökonomische, soziale, rechtliche, 
technische, raum- und zeitbezogene und Umweltaspekte. Davon ausgehend, dass eine solche 
umfassende Beurteilung nur als gemeinsame Anstrengung der Beteiligten möglich ist, wurde die 
Vision verfolgt, mit der betroffenen Bevölkerung, mit den zuständigen lokalen und kantonalen 
Behörden, mit privatwirtschaftlichen Vertretern und den kollaborierenden Wissenschaftern aus 
dem Integrierten Projekt Boden des Schweizer Nationalfonds ein gemeinsames 
Nachhaltigkeitslernen zu organisieren. Dabei wurde ein transdisziplinäres Forschungsparadigma 
angewendet. Obwohl der so angestossene lokale transdisziplinäre Prozess als teilweise 
gescheitert angesehen werden muss, konnte eine Reihe von Forschungsergebnissen als 
angewandte interdisziplinäre Arbeit erreicht werden. Diese Ergebnisse beziehen sich auf drei 
Bereiche der Umweltentscheidungsforschung: Wahrnehmen (Untersuchung der 
Risikowahrnehmung in der Bevölkerung), Bewerten (Bewertungsmodell mit ökonomischen, 
ökologischen, und sozialen Kriterien), und Erlernen (transdisziplinäre Umweltbildung). Sie 
bauen auf den Ergebnissen der naturwissenschaftlichen Teilprojekte des IP Boden über die 
vorhandene Schwermetallbelastung und mögliche Sanierungsmethoden auf und stellen eine 
Grundlage für zukünftiges und gemeinsames Nachhaltigkeitslernen dar. 
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Einleitung 
Die Lösung von komplexen Umweltproblemen, wie z.B. der Umgang mit Schadstoffen 
belasteten Böden, wie nationale/internationale Erfahrungen zeigen, bedarf es schon in den ersten 
Schritten der Problemlösung ein gemeinsames Vorgehen von zuständigen Behörden, 
betroffenen Bevölkerung, Wirtschaftsvertretern und Wissenschaftern. In diesem Prozess des 
Zusammenarbeitens werden nicht nur fachliche, z.B. bodenkundliche oder 
umwelttoxikologische Grundlagen werden benötigt. Wichtig ist es in diesem Prozess den 
Sachstand und die relevanten Auswirkungen für die Beteiligten einschliesslich der bestehenden 
wissenschaftlichen Unsicherheiten angemessen diskutieren. Wünschenswert ist hier ein 
transdisziplinärer Ansatz (Thompson Klein et al., 2001) der integralen Bewertung von 
Bodensanierungsmassnahmen (Scholz et al., 1997). Wesentlicher Bestandteil dieses Prozesses 
unter einer integralen Bewertung sind die Risikowahrnehmung der Betroffenen sowie der 
ökonomischen Auswirkungen von Bodenreinigungen. Wir stellen in diesem Artikel Ergebnisse 
aus verschiedenen Projekten, eine Schnittstelle zwischen Umweltnatur- und 
Umweltsozialwissenschaften, vor, welche die  
• Risikowahrnehmung der Betroffenen 
• die finanzwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Bodensanierungen 
• den Umgang mit Unsicherheiten in einem Consensus und Sicherheiten über die Wirksamkeit 
von Wohnsanierungsmassnahmen in einem Consensus-Bildungsprozess zwischen Experten 
und  
• die Ergebnisse einer integralen Bewertung vor, welche unter Wissenschaftlern durchgeführt 
worden ist. 
Es ist anzumerken, dass die ursprüngliche Intention des integrierten Projekt des Bodens diese 
Ergebnisse in einem partizipativen Prozess in der Gemeinde Dornach zu nutzen nicht erreicht 
werden konnte. Wir werden auf diesen Punkt in der Schlussdiskussion nochmals eingehen. Die 
Schwierigkeiten eines abgeklärten und rationalen Diskurses über Bodenrisiken, wie sie in 
einmaliger Form am Fallbeispiel Dornach erleben durften, zeigt, dass im Bereich 
Risikowahrnehmung und Risikokommunikation elementare Defizite bestehen. Es dürfte sich 
auch als Illusion erweisen; aktuelle Informationskampagnen diese grundsätzlichen Probleme der 
Risikowahrnehmung zu überkommen. Aus diesem Grund berichten wir über ein 
transdisziplinäres Projekt zu Bodenrisiken, welches am diskutierten Fallbeispiel in Schweizer 
Gymnasien durchgeführt worden ist.  
Das wissenschaftliche Ziel des praktischen Umgangs mit den vorliegenden 
Schwermetallbelastungen besteht darin, die gesellschaftliche Perspektive der Nachhaltigkeit mit 
den individuellen Bewertungen der beteiligten Akteure zu verbinden. Um dieses Ziel zu 
erreichen unterscheiden wir zwei Extremperspektiven. Eine expertenbasierte Nachhaltigkeits-
bewertung auf der einen Seite steht einer akteursbezogenen Realbewertung auf der anderen 
Seite gegenüber (siehe Abbildung 1).  
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Abb 1: zwei Extremperspektiven. Eine expertenbasierte Nachhaltigkeitsbewertung auf der einen 
Seite steht einer akteursbezogenen Realbewertung auf der anderen Seite gegenüber (siehe 
Abbildung 1).  
 
Wahrnehmen – Bewerten – Erlernen  
Grundlagen 
Eine determinierte, direkt messbare Schädigung der menschlichen Gesundheit durch 
Schwermetalle im Boden – in den in Dornach vorkommenden Konzentrationen – existiert nicht. 
Dass eine Gefährdung vorliegt, ist jedoch unbestritten. Ob daraus auch ein Schaden folgt, kann 
nicht mit Sicherheit gesagt werden. Das Risiko, das sich aus der Gefährdung ergibt, muss daher 
bei der Beurteilung der Belastung und allfälliger Sanierungsverfahren eine zentrale Stellung 
einnehmen. Im Sinne des dargestellten transdisziplinären Forschungsansatzes besteht das Risiko 
aber nicht (nur) in der Unsicherheit der von den Experten vorhergesagten Schäden. Vielmehr ist 
„Risiko“ ein Konstrukt, das bei der Beurteilung der Schwermetallbelstung durch die Beteiligten 
aktiviert wird. Nach unserem Ansatz gibt es also auf der einen Seite eine von den Experten 
erwartete Gefährdung durch Schwermetalle im Boden. Das Ausmass dieser Gefährdung und 
dessen Unsicherheit wird oft unter dem Begriff „Risiko“ versucht zu quantifizieren (z. B. Geiger 
& Schulin 1995). Auf der anderen Seite besitzt jeder der Beteiligten einen eigenen, subjektiven 
Begriff von Risiko, den er für die Beurteilung des eigenen Handelns heranzieht. Will man also 
als zuständige Behörde oder als Wissenschaftler eine in der Bevölkerung akzeptierte Sanierung 
unterstützen, muss man die Risiken (im Sinne von: die Risikokonstrukte) kennen, die die 
EinwohnerInnen wahrnehmen – etwas lax ausgedrückt: die sich die EinwohnerInnen vorstellen. 
Das kann natürlich im Einzelfall eine „naive“ (oder „unwissenschaftliche“) Risikovorstellung 
sein, kann aber auch (wie in den meisten Fällen) ein durch persönliche Erfahrung gewachsenes, 
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mit Fakten begründetes und überlegtes Konstrukt sein. Wie auch immer man dies von aussen 
beurteilen möchte – letztendlich wissen kann es nur der Betroffene selbst. Die Forschung über 
Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit hat verschiedene Modelle vorgestellt, unter welchen 
Bedingungen ein solches Risiko wahrgenommen wird, von welchen Faktoren es beeinflusst 
wird und wie es schematisch dargestellt wird (Fishburn 1984, Vlek und Stallen 1981, Yates und 
Stone 1992). Scholz & Tietje (2002, Seite 180f) haben basierend darauf eine „Allgemeine 
Risikofunktion“ definiert, in der die psychologisch und entscheidungsrelevanten Elemente mit 
den naturwissenschaftlich quantifizierbaren Risikoaspekten verbunden werden. Sie ist Teil des 
Risikohandlungsmodells (Scholz et al., 1997), das bereits in unserem früheren Terratech-Beitrag 
erläutert wurde (Scholz et al., 1999). Diese Risikofunktion ist der Gegenstand unserer 
Untersuchungen. Im nächsten Abschnitt (Wahrnehmen) wird der vorliegende Raum der 
Risikokognitionen eingegrenzt. Der darauf folgenden Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit den 
Kriterien (Values), von denen allgemein angenommen wird, dass sie die Risikowahrnehmung 
beeinflussen. Der letzte Teil des Kapitels untersucht eine Möglichkeit, wie in der 
Umweltbildung langfristige Risiken vermittelt werden können. 
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Wahrnehmen: Bewertungen durch die Bevölkerung von Dornach 
Bei einem transdisziplinären Vorgehen sollten auch die Betroffenen in den Beurteilungs- und 
Entscheidungsfindungsprozess einbezogen werden, um eine sozial akzeptierte und nachhaltige 
Lösung herbeizuführen (Covello & Allen, 1988). Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass Laien 
Risiken anders als Experten beurteilen. Während Experten sich eher an quantifizierbaren 
Indikatoren wie Schadenspotential und Eintretenswahrscheinlichkeit orientieren, spielen bei der 
Risikowahrnehmung von Laien vor allem qualitative Aspekte eine bedeutende Rolle. 
So zeigen erste Resultate einer Untersuchung, bei welcher wir Versuchspersonen innerhalb einer 
Computerumgebung verschiedene systematisch variierte Szenarios zu Schwermetallbelastung 
beurteilen liessen, dass diese die beiden Komponenten Schadensausmass und 
Eintretenswahrscheinlichkeit kaum multiplikativ verknüpfen, sondern eher additiv oder sie 
zentrieren auf eine Komponente, in der Regel auf den maximal möglichen Schaden und dies in 
Abhängigkeit zur emotional verspürten Betroffenheit (Grasmück, Hürlimann & Scholz, 2001). 
Neben diesen "quantitativen", resp. potenziell quantifizierbaren Aspekten von Schadensausmass 
und Wahrscheinlichkeit sind es aber eben hauptsächlich "qualitative Aspekte", welche das 
Laienurteil beeinflussen. So konnte Slovic (1987) im sogenannten "psychometrischen 
Paradigma" der Risikowahrnehmungsforschung aufzeigen, dass die subjektive Einschätzung 
von Aspekten wie Freiwilligkeit, Vertrautheit, Kontrollierbarkeit, Katastrophenpotenzial, 
gerechte Verteilung von Nutzen, etc. die Risikowahrnehmung und die Akzeptanz von 
Risikoquellen bei Laien beeinflussen. Eine Risikoquelle wird demnach weniger akzeptiert, wenn 
man ihr unfreiwillig ausgesetzt ist, sie weniger vertraut ist, sie als unkontrollierbar erscheint, sie 
eine mögliche Katastrophe in sich birgt, sowie ein allfälliger Nutzen ungerecht verteilt ist. 
Bei einer Befragung, bei der 40 Personen in Dornach und 40 Personen einer Kontrollgruppe 
teilnahmen, und die wir vor Ort durchführten (Weber, Scholz, Bühlmann, & Grasmück, (2001), 
liessen wir unter anderem die Risikosemantik von schwermetallbelasteten Böden bestimmen. 
Dabei konnten die drei Faktoren Unbehaglichkeit, Kontrolle und Merklichkeit (des 
Katastrophenpotenzials) bestätigt werden. Schwermetallbelastete Böden wurden im Vergleich 
zu anderen Risikoquellen als eher unkontrollierbar (0.43; Gentechnik: 0.81; Tabakgenuss: -1.3) 
und kaum merklich eingeschätzt (-0.31; Atomkraft: 1.28; Tabakgenuss: -0.55). Hinsichtlich der 
Unbehaglichkeit ergab sich eine indifferente Faktorenladung von 0,08 (Ozonloch: 0.79; 
Konservierungsstoffe: -0.63). 
Bei den Fragen, inwieweit eine Sanierung als notwendig und eine sanfte Sanierung als sinnvoll 
erachtet wird, zeigte sich, dass Nachhaltigkeitsüberlegungen bei der Beurteilung eine 
bedeutende Rolle spielen (siehe Grafik 3). Personen, welche bei schwermetallbelasteten Böden 
ein höheres Risiko für zukünftige Generationen sahen, beurteilten eine sanfte Sanierung auch als 
sinnvoller (r=.43**). 
Auch mussten die Befragten zwei Varianten der Phytoremediation mit dem Abtragen von 
Bodenmaterial vergleichen. Dabei war die Akzeptanz für ein sanftes Verfahren recht gross. Eine 
Phytoremediation wurde hinsichtlich der ökologischen Verträglichkeit und der Kosten-Nutzen-
Relation besser als das Abtragen des Bodenmaterials eingeschätzt. Das ästhetische 
Erscheinungsbild wurde für beide der vorgestellten Varianten "Tabak" und "Weiden" als positiv 
beurteilt. Das Abtragen von Boden wurde als wirksamer betrachtet. Bei der Frage nach der 
Wichtigkeit erhielten alle Aspekte auf einer Skala von 1 (= unwichtig) bis 7 (= sehr wichtig) 
einen durchschnittlichen Wert über 5. 
Bei der Phytoremediation dürfte die Sanierung gemäss Angaben der Dornacher eine maximale 
Dauer von 6.8 Jahre nicht überschreiten (Durchschnittswert). Allerdings je näher die Befragten 
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an der Emmissionsquelle wohnhaft sind, je länger sie bereits in Dornach wohnen und je mehr 
Land sie besitzen, desto weniger wird eine Sanierung als notwendig erachtet und, falls doch eine 
Sanierung durchgeführt würde, desto kürzer müsste die Sanierungsdauer dann sein. 
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Abbildung 3: Die Beurteilung von sanfter Sanierung durch die Dornacher Befragten. 
Antworten auf die Frage: „Warum halten Sie eine sanfte Sanierung generell für sinnvoll?“. Die 
Antwortmöglichkeiten wurden vorgegeben. (n=37, 3 Personen hielten eine (sanfte) Sanierung in 
keiner Weise als sinnvoll oder notwendig.) 
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Bewerten: Kriterien für Sanierungsalternativen 
Wirkgrössen und Belastungsvorstellung 
Um die Belastungsvorstellung zu erfassen, müssen die relevanten Wirkgrössen identifiziert 
werden und einem einfachen Systemmodell (Umweltmodell) zugeordnet werden können. Das 
Systemmodell besteht aus zwei Teilsystemen, der Landnutzung und den Stoffflüssen im Boden. 
Die Sanierungsalternativen und ihre Eigenschaften (Dauer der Sanierung, Kosten, Verkaufswert 
des Grundstücks, Nutzungseinschränkungen, Umweltauswirkungen (Ökobilanz des Verfahrens), 
gesundheitliche Gefährdung u.a.) gehören zum Landnutzungsmodell. Sie werden direkt durch 
die Wahl des Sanierungsverfahrens beeinflusst. Die Schadstoffbilanz im Boden und 
insbesondere die Schadstoffreduktion durch sanfte Sanierungsverfahren werden – neben der 
Wahl des Sanierungsverfahrens - durch die Bodeneigenschaften und die im Boden ablaufenden 
Prozesse bestimmt (insbesondere Schadstoffkonzentration, pH-Wert, Kalkgehalt und 
Pflanzenaufnahme, Löslichkeit). Die genaue Quantifizierung dieser Materialflüsse ist für eine 
einzelne Parzelle zu aufwendig. Die naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen hatten 
insbesondere das Ziel, die Unsicherheiten bei der Abschätzung dieser Materialflüsse zu 
reduzieren und verlässliche Aussagen über die Dauer einer sanften Sanierung und die erzielbare 
Schadstoffreduktion zu machen. Für die Bewertung der Sanierungsalternativen sind die 
Einschätzungen der erwarteten Stoffflüsse und deren Unsicherheiten essentiell. Daher wurden 
im Projekt ‚Konsens Technologische Leistungsfähigkeit’ Expertenschätzungen für die 
Wirkgrössen und entsprechende Folgerungen für die Sanierungsalternativen zusammengefasst. 
 
Boden
Leaching / Versickerung
Nutzung Nutzung
Sanierung
-Austausch
-Phytosanierung
-Mobilisierung
-Immobilisierung
Quelle
Senke 
(Pflanzenertrag,
Bodenreinigung)
0
0
Abbildung 4: Systemmodell 
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Bewertungskriterien 
Das Bewertungsmodell versucht, einen Sanierungsverantwortlichen in seiner individuellen 
Entscheidung zu unterstützen. Die Bewertungskriterien wurden subsummiert unter den drei 
Hauptkriterien Ökologie, Wirtschaftlichkeit und Sozialverträglichkeit (Scholz et al., 1999). 
Ökologische Kriterien sind: 
- die Bodenfruchtbarkeit (Bodenqualität),  
- nachhaltige Stoffflüsse (hier wird berücksichtigt, ob, welche Menge und in welcher 
Form  Schadstoffe im Boden verbleiben),  
- Umweltauswirkungen (Ökobilanz), und  
- Ökoeffizienz (vgl. dazu Scholz et al., 1999).  
Wirtschaftliche Kriterien sind  
- die direkten Kosten des Sanierungsverfahrens (für sanfte Sanierungsverfahren die 
Gesamtkosten während der mehrjährigen Dauer, diskontiert als gegenwärtige Kosten),  
- die Opportunitätskosten (gemessen als der Verlust, der durch die Verzögerung des 
Verkaufs eines Grundstücks durch eine anhaltende Sanierung entstehen würde) und  
- Belehnungswertkorrekturen (siehe Kasten).  
Da eine individuelle Bewertungsperspektive (zum Beispiel eines privaten Eigentümers) 
eingenommen wird, erfolgt die Bewertung der sozialen Verträglichkeit mit den Kriterien  
- gesundheitliches Risiko (in Abhängigkeit von der Nutzung und dem 
Schwermetallgehalt),  
- Nutzungsbeeinträchtigungen (hierzu gehören zum Beispiel: rechtliche Nutzungs-
einschränkungen, die Dauer des Verfahrens, Beeinträchtigungen durch Baumassnahmen 
wie Bodenabtrag oder durch das Anpflanzen von durch das Sanierungsverfahren 
vorgeschriebene Pflanzen in Hausgärten) und  
- die Erprobtheit des Verfahrens (ob zum Beispiel Erfahrungen aus vielfältigen 
Anwendungen vorliegen, oder ob es sich eher um prototypische Anwendungen handelt). 
Diese Bewertungskriterien werden mit Hilfe einer Multikriterienbewertung der 
Sanierungsalternativen zusammengefasst (s. Abb xx). 
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Bewertungsmodell Administration / Experten 
Das dargestellte Bewertungsmodell stellt den Rahmen für eine expertenunterstützte individuelle 
Bewertung dar. Im Einzelfall sind hier sowohl die Gewichtungen der Kriterien zu ergänzen als 
auch Änderungen an den Kriterien zuzulassen.  
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Abb 5: Schema der Multikriterienbewertung. 
 
Erlernen: Transdisziplinäre Umweltbildung 2001 (TDU) – Pilotstudie 
"Risiko & Boden" 
Da wir jahrzehntelange Bodenbelastungen heute nicht sofort beheben können und wir mit 
fruchtbarem Boden nachhaltig umgehen sollten, müssen wir auch Jugendliche als 
Entscheidungsträger von morgen in den langfristigen Lösungsprozess mit einbeziehen. So 
wurde im Rahmen des IP Boden ein Konzept für eine transdisziplinäre Umweltbildung (TDU) 
entwickelt (Hesske & Frischknecht-Tobler 1999, 2000). Es kombiniert fächerübergreifenden 
Unterricht mit Fallstudienmethode, projektartigem Unterricht und entdeckendem Lernen. Die 
Erprobung erfolgte an dem konkreten Fallbeispiel der Gemeinde Dornach, wo eine 
Gymnasialklasse der Kantonsschule Sargans die komplexe Umweltproblematik einer 
Bodenbelastung durch Schwermetalle nicht nur zusammen mit Akteuren praxisorientiert und 
ganzheitlich vermittelt erhielt, sondern auch aktiv am Problemlöseverfahren beteiligt wurden. 
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Ernüchtert stellten die Jugendlichen fest, dass sich viele Betroffene an die Bodenbelastung 
gewöhnt haben und kaum etwas dagegen unternehmen. - Die Evaluation dieser Pilotstudie in 
Form eines experimentellen Designs mit zwei Kontrollklassen (siehe Graphik) ergab, dass 
sowohl TDU als auch herkömmlicher Unterricht zum Thema Boden eine signifikante Erhöhung 
des Fachwissens zum Thema Boden und des allgemeinen Umweltwissens zur Folge hat, im 
Gegensatz zur Klasse ohne Bodenunterricht. Dieser Zuwachs ist auch drei Monate nach 
Intervention noch feststellbar. Zusätzlich erwies sich, dass in der Gruppe mit TDU, im 
Gegensatz zur Gruppe mit normalem Bodenunterricht, ebenfalls das allgemeine 
Umweltverhalten signifikant anstieg. 
 
Abb. 6: Wirksamkeit der TDU und zweier Arten von Vergleichsunterricht gemessen am Zuwachs 
von spezifischem Bodenwissen sowie allgemeinem Umweltwissen und Umweltverhalten zwischen 
März (vor der Intervention) und September 2001 (drei Monate nach Intervention). Angabe der 
Personenmittelwerte in logarithmierten Wahrscheinlichkeiten (logits), Signifikanz des Zuwachses 
in jeder Gruppe: **: p < .01; ***: p < .001; n.s.: nicht signifikant. Vertikale Linien bezeichnen 
90%-Vertrauensintervalle: nicht überlappende Linien weisen auf bedeutsame 
Gruppenunterschiede hin. 
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Diskussion und Schlussfolgerungen 
Wir haben gezeigt, in welcher Weise im Bereich der Problemlösung des Zusammenspiels 
zwischen Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften gefordert ist. Von noch grösserer Bedeutung 
erscheint uns jedoch retrospektiv die Gestaltung von transdisziplinären, d.h., partizipativen, die 
Theorie und die Praxis gleichermassen einbeziehenden Problemlösungsprozessen.  
Wie eingangs angedeutet, konnte ein solcher Prozess in der Gemeinde Dornach nicht realisiert 
werden. Grosse Ängste und Verengungen in der Risikowahrnehmung (vgl. Grasmück et al. 
2001) haben vermutlich ihre Gründung in der Furcht vor Einbussen im Standortimage und im 
Wertverlust von Grundstücken. Diese - an andern Orten nicht vorzufindende - Zurückhaltung, 
lässt sich nahezu 15 Jahre zurückverfolgen. Es wurden anfänglich Risikoinformation der 
Bevölkerung durch die Bodenbelastung zurückgehalten oder verharmlost bis eine alarmierende 
Boden- und Pflanzenuntersuchung (Wirz & Winistörfer, 1987) und Gerüchte über die schlechte 
Bodenqualität die Wohnbevölkerung verunsicherten und zu verstimmen begannen. 
Bemerkenswert ist auch, das nahezu 15 Jahre vergangen sind, bis von Seiten der übergeordneten 
Kantonalen und Bundesbehörden klare Vorschriften kommuniziert wurden. Grundlage für 
diesen Vollzug war die Revision des USG und die revidierte Verordnung über die Belastungen 
des Bodens VBBo (1998 in Kraft getreten). Aber auch diese Grundlagen konnten eine Reihe 
von Dilemmata, welche in Schwierigkeit der Belastungsfeststellung und damit verbunden der 
Sanierungsbedarfs nicht hinreichend klären. Hinzu kam, dass durch den intransparenten und 
weitgehend hinter verschlossenen Türen stattfindenden Verhandlungsprozess mit dem 
Verursacher und durch Änderung der Ämterstruktur im Kanton weitere Verzögerungen und 
Leerräume entstanden. 
Die Möglichkeiten einer integralen Bewertung, wie sie im vorliegenden Papier dargestellt 
wurden, konnten somit am Fall Dornach keine praktische Wirkung zeitigen. Dennoch konnte 
eine gewisse Klärung erreicht werden, da die lange Zeit diskutierte Sanierungsvariante der 
Phytosanierung wegen der von der Bevölkerung nicht akzeptierten Sanierungsdauer (>20 Jahre) 
nicht in Frage kam (siehe Scholz et al., 1999). Im Zusammenspiel mit den grossen 
Unsicherheiten über die Bodenbelastungen und der noch offen stehenden Frage, wie das 
Verursacherprinzip zu interpretieren ist, lässt erwarten, dass es auch im vorliegenden Fall 
Dornach auch mittelfristig keine flächendeckende befriedigende Lösung des 
Bodenbelastungsproblems geben wird.  
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Appendix 2: Screenshots of the Microworld 'Dornhausen' 
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